First Amendment Defenses in Antitrust Litigation by Sullivan, E. Thomas
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 46 
Issue 3 Summer 1981 Article 2 
Summer 1981 
First Amendment Defenses in Antitrust Litigation 
E. Thomas Sullivan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
E. Thomas Sullivan, First Amendment Defenses in Antitrust Litigation, 46 MO. L. REV. (1981) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 





I. Introduction ..................................... 518
II. Development of Commercial Speech Protection ........ 521
A. The Early Rule -Valentine ..................... 521
B. Evolution of First Amendment Protection ......... 523
1. Content-Based Analysis .................... 523
2. Retreat from the Traditional Approach ....... 526
C. Limitations on Protection ....................... 529
1. Illegal Conduct ........................... 529
2. Lower-Level Protection and Inapplicability
of the Overbreadth Doctrine ................. 531
D. A Structured Approach ........................ 537
III. Applicability of the Overbreadth Doctrine and Vague-
ness-Summary and Criticism ...................... 542
A. Third-Party Overbreadth ...................... 542
B. Single-Party Overbreadth ...................... 546
C. Retreat from the Overbreadth Doctrine ........... 547
D. Relationship Between Overbreadth and Vagueness.. 548
IV. The Impact of Economic Theories on Business Communi-
cations and Its Effects on First Amendment Protection... 552
A. Interseller Price Communications Under the
ShermanAct ................................. 553
1. Early Developments ........................ 553
2. Toward a Structural Approach and Per Se Rule . 558
3. Less Structural Emphasis and the Adoption of
Rule ofReason ............................ 558
4. Current Enforcement Approaches ............ 561
B. A Suggested Approach ......................... 571
V. Conclusion ...................................... 574
* © Copyright 1981 E. Thomas Sullivan.
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. B.A.,
1970, Drake University; J.D., 1973, Indiana University. The author wishes to ex-
press appreciation to his colleagues Professors Grant Nelson, Richard Tyler,
David Fischer, Wayne Brazil, Alfred Neely, and David Shores for their review of
an earlier draft of this Article. The author also acknowledges the able and in-
sightful research assistance of Martin Loring, J.D., 1981, University of Missouri-
Columbia, in the preparation of this Article.
1
Sullivan: Sullivan: First Amendment Defenses in Antitrust Litigation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most cited and frequently litigated statements from the
Supreme Court in trade regulation jurisprudence is the broad charge, arti-
culated in FTC v. National Lead Co., that the government is not confined
to blocking " 'the narrow lane the transgressor has traveled; it must be
allowed effectively to close all roads to the prohibited goal.' "I While the
order entered in National Lead, which prohibited adoption of prices
based on a zone system that had the purpose or effect of matching compet-
itors' prices, was drawn more precisely than those in earlier basing point
delivered price decrees,2 many defendants and their counsel who find
themselves litigating the potential broadsweep of antitrust and trade
regulation orders suggested in National Lead are at a loss when defining
the parameters of an order. Counsel often discover that the battlelines of
trade regulation litigation center on the breadth and scope of the potential
decree or order rather than on the issue of liability. This is evident particu-
larly in the current enforcement approaches under the antitrust laws. As
this Article will discuss, government enforcement agencies presently are
pursuing broad behavioral orders designed to reduce business communi-
cations and market information disseminated between competitors. The
enforcement theory centers on elimination of parallel conduct among
firms by prohibiting public price announcements or discussions. The Su-
preme Court, however, has neither advanced nor developed a systematic
approach in defining the permissible boundaries governing trade regula-
tion orders. Given the implications that recent developments in the first
amendment commercial speech area have on the permissible bounds of an
order, the time is appropriate to address these issues.
There is increasing authority that the first amendment and numerous
related arguments are the principal defenses for challenging ambiguous
1. 352 U.S. 419, 429 (1957) (quoting FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470,
473 (1952)). In National Lead, respondents were charged with utilization of an
arbitrary zone delivered pricing system in the sale of lead pigments. The Court
sanctioned an FTC order prohibiting the quoting of prices calculated on a zone
price system which had the purpose or effect of" 'systematically matching... the
delivered prices of other sellers.' " Id. at 423 (quoting National Lead Co., 49
F.T.C. 791, 873 (1953), modified, 227 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'd, 352 U.S.
419 (1957)).
2. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948). The Commission's
order directed respondents to "forthwith cease and desist from entering into, con-
tinuing, cooperating in, or carrying out any planned common course of action,
understanding, agreement, combination, or conspiracy ... to do or perform any
of the following things." Cement Inst., 37 F.T.C. 87, 259-60 (1943), vacated sub
nom. Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. FTC, 157 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1946), rev'd sub
nom. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948). While the Cement Institute
decree prohibited a common course of action such as a combination or agree-
ment, it was less specific on whether interdependent action was enjoined.
518 [Vol. 46
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and otherwise unconstitutional orders that arguably invade constitution-
ally protected economic activity. That the activity sought to be regulated is
purely economic or commercial in nature does not mean that it is constitu-
tionally insignificant or unprotected. Since 19753 the Supreme Court has
signaled that overbroad governmental regulations could be challenged
even if the activities sought to be regulated were commercial or economic
in nature. A year later the Court sounded the death knell to the previously
entrenched notion 4 that the first amendment has no application to wholly
economic or commercial communications. 5 In time, the Court's expansive
development of the law in this area6 made clear that first amendment
defenses, even in the absence of a political content, extend to nondecep-
tive, ordinary business communications which are informational or pro-
motional in nature. 7 Relying on a theory that the exchange of business and
economic information is important to our free market exchange of ideas in
the allocation of resources,8 the Court has sanctioned, within the commer-
cial speech context, the advertisement of price information. In so doing,
the Court has recognized that the protected speech has a marketplace
focus and concern for both purchaser-oriented 9 and seller-motivated 0
profit interests.
3. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (newspaper advertising by
abortion clinic may not be prohibited).
4. See, e.g., Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951)
(first imendment doesn't require city to allow magazine salesmen to solicit door-
to-door); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (commercial speech not
protected under the first amendment).
5. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (price advertising for prescription drugs may not be
prohibited).
6. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557 (1980); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); ,First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assocs.,
Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
7. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761.
8. Id. at 765.
9. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 374-75 (1977).
10. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761. Although
the antitrust communications, which will be discussed subsequently in this Arti-
cle, do not utilize necessarily traditional media advertising, they should be en-
titled to no less protection under the first amendment merely because the
communications are spoken or written. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-63, 567-68 (1980); First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 773 n.7 (1978); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 92 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at
764. Specifically, the solicitation of a customer or the publication of a manufac-
turer's price list would come within the commercial speech doctrine. See Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 580 (Stevens, J., concurring).
19811
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When economic-motivated communication is given first amendment
protection, though limited, tensions develop between the proper govern-
mental regulation of that business communication and the values which
underlie the first amendment. Although the recent commercial speech
developments are welcomed by the business community, the tension be-
tween them and traditional antitrust and trade regulation enforcement
has led to uncertainty about the defenses available in trade regulation
litigation.
This is especially true since the Court has suggested that the first
amendment, at least in the commercial speech context, is inapplicable if
the speech sought to be protected is part of an illegal activity."I This Arti-
cle will explore the validity and strength of traditional first amendment
defenses in antitrust litigation as they apply at the remedial order stage.1 2
11. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376, 389 (1973). See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
12. This Article will not discuss the first amendment defense established
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Under this doctrine, first articulated in
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961), an antitrust violation cannot be predicated on efforts by competitors to
petition for governmental action which has the intent or effect of restricting com-
petition. See also UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). In Noerr, the
Supreme Court held that the antitrust laws proscribe only trade restraints by
private action, not restraint on trade or monopolization that is the result of valid
governmental action. 365 U.S. at 136. The Court's conclusion was based on the
reasoning that the antitrust laws do not "prohibit two or more persons from
associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to
take particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or a
monopoly." Id. The Court later made clear that the immunity imposed under the
doctrine was grounded-in the first amendment. California Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); Missouri v. National Org. for Women,
Inc., 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 122 (1980).
Certain limitations, however, have been imposed under the doctrine. If the
concerted activity by competitors is a sham to conceal an attempt to interfere with
a competitor's commercial interests, immunity from prosecution does not exist.
404 U.S. at 512; 365 U.S. at 144. See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F.
Supp. 168, 175 n.9 (D. Del. 1979). Moreover, lower federal courts have held that
the immunity is inapplicable if the concerted efforts by competitors relate to
private commercial transactions with the government, e.g., the government, as a
purchaser of goods, acts in a commercial capacity. See, e.g., George R. Whitten,
Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 31-34 (lst Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970). The rationale for this exception is that "the govern-
ment ... is not acting as a political body but as a participant in the marketplace."
General Aircraft Corp. v. Air America, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3, 7 (D.D.C. 1979).
See Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammed, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Chauffeurs Local 150, 440 F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826
(1971).
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss3/2
FIRST AMENDMENT AND ANTITRUST
It will focus on the development of those defenses, their application since
the reawakening of the commercial speech doctrine, and limitations on
their use. Specifically, the Article will discuss (1) whether and under what
circumstances a remedial order can restrict economic conduct which
arguably comes within the commercial speech doctrine, (2) whether any
principles delimit the "illegal conduct" exception to the commercial
speech doctrine, (3) whether traditional standards of overbreadth analysis
and vagueness are applicable when the conduct is protected under the
commercial speech doctrine, and (4) whether the structure of the industry
should determine the extent of first amendment defenses. Finally, the
Article will suggest a systematic approach to analyzing first amendment
issues raised by antitrust decrees.
The analytical model developed proposes that before business com-
munications and parallel conduct can be regulated by conduct-oriented
orders, courts must find that there is a substantial governmental interest
served by the order, that the restriction on the business speech directly ad-
vances the governmental interest, and that the order is no broader than
necessary to achieve the governmental interest. Moreover, if the business
communication is a substantial part or facilitating component of conduct
found violative of the antitrust laws, it is not entitled to full commercial
speech protection, but should be protected nevertheless by application of
the overbreadth doctrine and the "narrowness" test from the sweep of an
overbroad order that might deter competitive activity.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH PROTECTION
A. The Early Rule-Valentine
The principle that speech concerning a business or economic message
is important because of its place in the competitive marketplace of ideas is
a recent development.1 3 The Supreme Court announced early that the
first amendment ought not protect commercial advertising. In Valentine
v. Chrestensen,14 the Court upheld a city sanitary ordinance", which for-
bade distribution of handbills not devoted to an informational function or
a public interest. The challenged conduct was the distribution of handbills
advertising Valentine's business establishment. While part of the handbill
was devoted entirely to soliciting customers, another part protested the
City's failure to give Valentine wharfage facilities at a municipal pier
where he could exhibit his submarine for commercial purposes.' 6 Reject-
ing Valentine's argument that the totality of the handbill was worthy of
constitutional protection because it contained a "protest against official
13. See notes 3-10 and accompanying text supra.
14. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
15. The ordinance in question was part of the Sanitary Code, which stated
specifically that it was intended to cover only "commercial and business advertis-
ing matter." Id. at 53 n.1.
16. Id. at 53.
1981]
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conduct,"'17 the Court concluded implicitly that commercial speech, even
though part of a public protest, was not entitled to first amendment pro-
tection. The fact that the commercial content was joined on the same
handbill with a political protest did not dissuade the Court. The Court
reasoned that if it extended constitutional protection to the handbill, it
would be easy to evade a ban on commercial advertising under the guise of
appending to the commercial message a political protest.' Thus, the
Court was unwilling to consider the public or political significance of the
handbill, and declared that the "Constitution imposes no ... restraint on
government as respects purely commercial advertising.' 9
For twenty-three years after Valentine, the courts, in varying degrees,
followed Valentine's admonition that commercial communications were
without first amendment protection.2" But the subsequent cases had dif-
ficulty construing governmental regulation within the ambiguous Valen-
tine standard of "commercial speech." At first, the Supreme Court sug-
gested that the central inquiry in defining commercial speech was whether
the primary purpose or motive of the communication was business-
oriented. 2' An incidental profit-oriented component which was part of an
otherwise protected speech did not cause the communication to lose con-
stitutional value. 22
17. Id. at 55. See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819 (1975)
(political protest was "appended solely for the purpose of evading the
ordinance").
18. 316 U.S. at 55.
19. Id. at 54. See also Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147
(1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Semler v. Oregon State Bd.
of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105
(1932) (indicated that commercial communications could be regulated). But see
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
20. But cf. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-14 (1959)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (freedom of speech and press not confined to discourse
of particular kind and nature); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
501-02 (1952) (motion pictures protected by first amendment despite fact that
they are large-scale business conducted for profit); Breard v. City of Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1951) (selling periodicals does not exclude them from first
amendment protection); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (Court
indicated that a less broad standard would be applied in excluding commercial
speech; if the commercial nature of the speech was incidental to an otherwise pro-
tected message, it might receive some protection). See also Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (Court
continued to analyze the speech in terms of motive).
21. E.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943). While Valentine
held implicitly that all communications transmitted for the primary motive of
economic gain were considered commercial and not entitled to protection, this
broad interpretation would include labor disputes and other activities where one
made a living through communication.
22. Id. at 111.
[Vol. 46522
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B. Evolution of First Amendment Protection
1. Content-Based Analysis
The "primary purpose" standard delimiting the constitutional protec-
tion of commercial speech was denounced formally by the Court in the
early 1960s, when it adopted a content-based analytical approach. In New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,23 while reiterating that a profit-oriented
message was not entitled to first amendment consideration, the Court fo-
cused on the content of the communication, rather than its purpose, in
determining whether the speech was purely business in nature or informa-
tional in the sense of conveying ideas that were within the public interest. 24
The issue in question was whether a paid advertisement which had a
public and political context could be the subject of a libel action. In
chartering a new content-based approach, the Court did not reject
outright Valentine's command that purely business-motivated speech is
unworthy of first amendment protection. Instead, the New York Times
Court distinguished Valentine on the theory that the challenged Times
publication was not commercial 5 because "[ilt communicated informa-
tion, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and
sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and ob-
jectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern." 26
The fart that the advertising in question had been paid for was
deemed immaterial. 27 Under the content-based approach, the motive or
the manner and forum in which constitutionally protected speech was dis-
seminated was held not determinative. 28 The Court commented that if thd
23. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times, the Court for the first time
enunciated a first amendment constitutional defense in defamation actions. A
libel action was brought against the Times in Alabama by a city official. The suit
was based on a paid advertisement the Times had published that described the
poor treatment black students, while protesting segregation, had received in
Montgomery. The jury returned a verdict against the Times. The Supreme Court
reversed on the ground that the defamation law applied by the Alabama courts
was insufficient constitutionally because it failed to provide the press with safe-
guards which were required by the first amendment. The Court held that the first
amendment prohibits a public official from recovery in a defamation suit against
the press, unless it is established that the libelous statement was made "with [ac-
tual] knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false." Id. at 279-80.
24. See also Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945).
25. 376 U.S. at 266.
26. Id.
27. Id. See also Cammarano v. United States, 858 U.S. 498, 514 (1959)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (profit motivation should not be critical in determina-
tion of constitutional protection over speech).
28. 376 U.S. at 266.
1981]
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content of "the allegedly libelous statements would otherwise be consti-
tutionally protected .... they do not forfeit that protection because they
were published in the form of a paid advertisement."19 Thus, if the com-
munication had a public interest content, it received protection,
regardless of the commercial context.
The next indication of Valentine's demise came in another press
advertisement case. In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Relations,"0 where a newspaper challenged an ordinance pro-
hibiting gender-designated captions in advertising, the majority signaled
that the Court would be willing to reconsider in future cases whether "the
distinction between commercial and other speech"31 should continue.
Justice Powell, at the outset of the opinion, noted that commercial speech
is not defined by "the mere fact that it relates to an advertisement. "3 2
Valentine's primary motive analysis again was addressed and rejected:
If a newspaper's profit motive were determinative, all aspects of its
operations-from the selection of news stories to the choice of
editorial position-would be subject to regulation if it could be
established that they were conducted with a view toward increased
sales. Such a basis for regulation clearly would be incompatible
with the First Amendment.- s
Valentine was characterized as a case in which the challenged speech did
nothing more than propose a commercial transaction, notwithstanding
the fact that it also contained a message of political significance."s Follow-
ing this view, the employment advertisements of Pittsburgh Press were
deemed more similar in content to Valentine's business solicitation than to
New York Times'information-oriented public interest advertisement. The
gender-designated captions, therefore, were held to be "classic examples
of commercial speech" 5 and, because of the nature of the contert, not en-
titled to first amendment protection.
29. Id. (footnote omitted).
30. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
31. Id. at 388. In Pittsburgh Press, a newspaper was charged with violating
an ordinance which forbade "help wanted" advertisements being arranged
according to gender-designated captions. The newspaper argued that the urdi-
nance violated freedoms of speech and press because it restricted editorial judg-
ment in the placement of advertising. The purpose of the ordinance was to pro-
hibit discrimination, inter alia, on the basis of sex. Id. at 378. Against this attack
the ordinance was upheld, but the Court hinted at its future retreat from the doc-
trine that commercial speech is not entitled to protection. "Whatever the merits
of this contention may be [abrogating the distinction between commercial and
other speech] in other contexts, it is unpersuasive in this case [because of the il-
legal nature of the underlying conduct]." Id. at 388.
32. Id. at 384. See id. at 388; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 266.
33. 413 U.S. at 385.
34. Id. See text accompanying notes 16-19 supra.
35. 413 U.S. at 385. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
[Vol. 46524
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Pittsburgh Press is important for the present analysis, not because of its
unwillingness to deviate from the Valentine/New York Times per se pro-
scription against constitutional protection for economic-motivated
speech, but because the speech (advertisement) sought to be protected
could have facilitated or furthered an illegal activity-gender-based
employment discrimination.3 6 The Court held explicitly that speech which
furthers illegal conduct, even if the conduct is commercial in nature, is not
fully protected by the first amendment.3 7 The Court justified the order
banning advertisements in a gender-designated matter on the ground that
the restriction on speech was incidental to the valid regulation of the
underlying illegal commercial activity of discrimination in employment.
Thus, the Court approved an ordinance, and an order drawn under it,
which made it unlawful to publish an advertisement that aided an
unlawful employment practice. On this point, Pittsburgh Press is not fully
instructive because it failed to address how closely related or incidental to
the illegal activity the speech must be before there can be valid govern-
ment regulation of the economic activity.38 The Supreme Court, however,
did indicate that the advertisements might have received a degree of first
amendment protection if the content of the message had been legal.39 In
the end, the Court reaffirmed New York Times' content analysis, although
the result differed in that the advertising content in Pittsburgh Press was
319 U.S. 190 (1943); Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582
(D.D.C. 1971), affd mem., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
36. 413 U.S. at 388-89. The Court found that the placement of such an ad
would aid an employer in indicating an illegal sex preference.
37. Id.
38. For a more extensive discussion of this point, see text accompanying
notes 30-35 supra. The Court also held, without explanation, that the modified
order which had been entered by the state trial court was not overbroad. 413 U.S.
at 390. Originally, the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations had ordered
the newspaper to cease and desist from using a classification system that had sex-
designated captions or references. On appeal, that order was modified by the
Commonwealth court so that the newspaper could publish gender-designated
columns for employers who were exempt from the antidiscrimination provisions
of the law. The ordinance apparently applied only to employers who had five or
more employees. Certain other categories were excluded from the law's coverage.
Id. at 380. "The modified order... [barred] 'all reference to sex in employment
advertising column headings, except as may be exempt under said Ordinance, or
as may be certified as exempt by said Commission.' "Id. at 380-81 (quoting Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 4 Pa. Commw. Ct.
448, 470, 287 A.2d 161, 172 (1972), affd, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)). Arguably, had
the order not been modified, the newspaper would have had a substantial
challenge, under an overbreadth analysis, to the original broad sweep of the
order.
39. 413 U.S. at 389.
1981] 525
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found to be illegally discriminatory and, hence, not entitled to protec-
tion.40
2. Retreat from the Traditional Approach
Although post- Valentine cases altered the focus of the commercial
speech analysis, the core holding that pure commercial speech was unpro-
tected under the first amendment continued until 1975. In a series of cases
beginning with Bigelow v. Virginia4 in 1975 and culminatingwith Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission42 in 1980, the
Court extended the reach of the first amendment. In the process, Valen-
tine ultimately was overruled.
That Valentine stood on unsure footing became more obvious in
Bigelow where the Court, confronted with a challenge to a statute pro-
hibiting abortion advertising, commented that Valentine's import did not
support the proposition that commercial advertising was "unprotected per
se. '" Although the challenged advertisement in Bigelow appeared facially
to be purely commercial, the Court strained in interpreting it to have
"public interest" qualities, thus, distinguishing it from Valentine's pure
commercial speech exception. Therefore, the Court was able, albeit
unpersuasively, to avoid outright rejection of Valentine.44
In concluding that Bigelow's misdemeanor conviction should be
reversed because the solicitation had a public interest content entitled to
first amendment protection, the Court introduced a balancing test that
40. In distinguishing New York Times, the Court in Pittsburgh Press
ultimately found that the content of employment ads was more similar analytical-
ly to the solicitation handbills in Valentine than to the paid political adver-
tisements in New York Times. Id. at 385.
41. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). Bigelow, a newspaper editor who had published an
advertisement for abortion services, was convicted under a Virginia criminal
statute that prohibited the circulation of a publication which encouraged abor-
tion. The advertisement was placed by an out-of-state abortion clinic. Id. at
811-12. The conviction was affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court. While
Bigelow's appeal was pending before the United States Supreme Court, the Court
decided Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973). The Court vacated Bigelow's conviction and remanded the case to the
Virginia court for further consideration. The Virginia court reached the same
result based on Bigelow's lack of standing to make a constitutional challenge and
Bigelow again appealed. 421 U.S. at 815.
42. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). For a discussion of Central Hudson, see notes
87-106 and accompanying text infra.
43. 421 U.S. at 820. The Court noted that "[t]he relationship of speech to
the marketplace of products or of services does not make it valueless in the
marketplace of ideas." Id. at 826.
44. The "public interest" qualities were present, the Court opined, because
the advertisement informed the public that abortions were free in New York,
where there were no residency requirements. Id. at 822.
[Vol. 46
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weighed first amendment interests against the public interest served by the
regulation. 45 Although the Court in other first amendment contexts had
advanced a balancing test,4 6 the balancing approach used by the Bigelow
Court suggested that, while it was willing to concede that commercial
speech was entitled to some degree of first amendment recognition, it was
not willing to give business-oriented speech the same status as political or
opinion speech. The Court was cautious in pushing no further. It saved for
another time the standard by which economic-motivated speech was to be
protected, including the substantiality required of the governmental inter-
est and the relative directness required of the governmental regulation to
the interest being served.
In the Court term after Bigelow, a statutory proscription against the
advertisement of prescription drugs provided the basis on which the Court
ended its thirty-four year flirtation with Valentine's inelastic restrictions.
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc. ,47 the Court for the first time directly confronted the question
whether pure commercial speech was entitled to first amendment recogni-
tion. At issue was a Virginia statute that declared it unprofessional con-
duct for a pharmacist to advertise prescription drug prices. The question
posited was whether a pure profit-oriented business solicitation that did
" 'no more than propose a commercial transaction,' ",48 such as " 'I will sell
you the X prescription drug at the Y price' ",49 should be deemed constitu-
tionally protected.
Initially, the Court recognized that its past decisions indicated pure
business-motivated speech deserved no protection.5" But after weighing
45. Id. at 826. The Court noted that a factor which should be weighed is the
relationship of the speech to the commercial activity. In addition, the Court
looked at the commercial activity to determine whether it would adversely affect
medical care. Id. at 827. The Court found Virginia's interests in that respect to be
limited to medical care provided within the state. Since the advertising pertained
to services being performed in another state, Virginia had no interest in it. Its
purported interest was merely "an interest in regulating what Virginians may
hear or read about the New York services." Id. Such an interest, the Court held,
was negligible at best. Id. at 828.
46. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412-14 (1974); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 378-80 (1968); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Pat-
terson, 357 U.S. 449, 463-65 (1958); Frohwerkv. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206
(1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See also note 93 infra.
47. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The plaintiffs in the case were prescription drug
consumers and pharmacists who challenged a Virginia state statute which made
it unprofessional conduct for a pharmacist to advertise prescription drug prices.
48. Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 385).
49. Id. at 761.
50. Id. at 758.
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the interests"1 served by extending first amendment protection to pure
commercial messages, the Court held squarely that a pure profit-oriented
communication deserved some first amendment protection. 2
51. For the first time the Court squarely confronted whose right it was pro-
tecting by the extension of the first amendment. It concluded that the right is en-
joyed by both the advertiser and the recipient of the commercial message. Id. at
756-57. The Court reasoned that the advertiser's profit motive business interest
alone was enough to bring it within the scope of protection, just as it had earlier
expressed in labor dispute cases that "both the employee and the employer are
protected by the First Amendment when they express themselves on the merits of
the dispute." Id. at 762. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 595 U.S. 575 (1969);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). There was no need, therefore, to re-
quire or invoke New York Times' or Bigelow's public interest content analysis in
order to find the advertisement protected. A business communication that pro-
posed no more than a purchase or sale of a product was protected. But when the
Court addressed the reciprocal right to receive the price information, it couched
that right n terms of the public interest in the flow of commercial information,
which is "indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise
system." 425 U.S. at 765. The Court seemed, therefore, at least for the justifica-
tion that consumers have a right to receive protected commercial speech, to
return to the content-based public interest analysis utilized in New York Times
and Bigelow. Overtones also were present that the Court, through its public inter-
est analysis, was attempting to establish the right by aligning it with more tradi-
tional political or pure speech doctrines. The doctrinal debate concerning the
first amendment underpinnings in this area is voluminous. See, e.g., A. MEIKLE-
JOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOvERNMENT (1948); Baker,
Commercial Speech: A Problem In the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1
(1976); BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Emerson,
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963);
Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REV.
372 (1979); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and
the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979); Karst, Equalityas a CentralPrin-
ciple in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975); D. Meiklejohn,
Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 13 CAL. W.L. REv. 430 (1977);
Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971); Rotunda, The
Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080;
Note, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Expression, 3 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 761 (1976); Comment, Prior Restraints and Restrictions on Advertising
After Virginia Pharmacy Board: The Commercial Speech Doctrine Reform-
ulated, 43 Mo. L. REV. 64 (1978).
52. 425 U.S. at 762. The lesser protection afforded commercial com-
munication did not cover such areas as false and deceptive, libelous, or illegal
commercial speech. Those areas remained outside the first amendment protec-
tion. Id. at 770-71. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413
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If the economic communications were not misleading, libelous, or
related to an unlawful activity, the speech was still subject to a balancing
test to determine the permissible boundaries of the government regula-
tion.5 3 As in Bigelow, it was unclear what balancing standard the Court
utilized, although it implied that it would scrutinize under the first amend-
ment the governmental interest and regulation more closely than it would
under the rational relationship test employed in fourteenth amendment
equal protection analysis. 54 In its now famous footnote 24, the Court sum-
marized the central premise of its new doctrine: pure business-motivated
speech enjoys some first amendment significance, but because it retains
qualities that differentiate it from pure political speech, it does not enjoy
the full panoply of rights afforded under the first amendment. 55 Thus,
while the developments in the law to this point had endowed commercial
communications with a substantial degree of protection, the scope of that
protection remained constricted by the illegality rule of Pittsburgh Press
and by the limitations inherent in Virginia Pharmacy.
C. Limitations on Protection
1. Illegal Conduct
The "illegal conduct" exception of Pittsburgh Press stems from well-
established first amendment doctrine. 56 Its application to commercial
speech thus is not unexpected. The scope and particularity of that applica-
tion is, however, far from certain. Bigelow's strained reasoning did not
permit a clear break from Valentine, but did shed light on Pittsburgh
U.S. 376 (1973); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d
205 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972).
53. 425 U.S. at 766-70. In addition, the Court observed that it had long
been a practice under first amendment protection to regulate speech regarding
reasonable time, place, and manner, as long as the regulation did not single "out
speech of a particular content." Id. at 771.
54. Id. at 769. See Schiro, Commercial Speech: The Demise of a Chimera,
1976 SUP. CT. REV. 45. When Virginia Pharmacy was decided, the Court, in
noncommercial first amendment speech cases, had required a compelling inter-
est in order for the government regulation to survive challenge. See Nixon v. Ad-
ministrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 467 (1977); Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705, 716 (1977); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362-63 (1976); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960). Generally, under the compelling interest test the inquiry would be: (1)
whether the interest pursued by the government is "compelling"; (2) if so,
whether the means employed are necessary to achieve the compelling governmen-
tal interest, e.g., relative analysis between means and ends-whether well-
tailored and narrowly drawn. The burden of persuasion on these issues is on the
government.
55. 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
56. E.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
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Press' illegal conduct exception. The Court implied that if the commercial
message furthered a criminal scheme, it would not be protected.57 Pitts-
burgh Press had held only that speech which itself is illegal or which adver-
tises an illegal activity is without protection." The Bigelow Court declin-
ed, however, to establish the precise extent of the illegal conduct excep-
tion. Moreover, the Court would not go so far as to state that the commer-
cial promotion of an illegal activity came within the Pittsburgh Press ille-
gal conduct ban, a notion that necessarily seemed to follow.59
The most recent Supreme Court case touching on the Pittsburgh Press
illegal conduct exception was Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of
Willingboro.60 In Linmark, a township adopted an ordinance prohibiting
the use of "For Sale" or "Sold" signs on real estate in the township. The
ordinance was challenged on the ground that it restricted first amendment
communications. In defense of the ordinance, the township argued that
the ordinance served the interest of promoting racially integrated housing
by stemming the flight of white homeowners from communities that were
racially integrated. 6' While recognizing this societal interest as an impor-
tant goal, the Court nevertheless struck down the ordinance because the
township failed to demonstrate that the ordinance was necessary to assure
that the community remained integrated, and because it impaired the
dissemination of truthful commercial information. The Court declared
the ordinance constitutionally infirm, as it had done in Virginia Phar-
macy, on the theory that the regulation was too indirect or unnecessary to
achieve the important governmental interests advanced. 62
Implicit in Linmark's reasoning is the finding that the information be-
ing disseminated and conduct involved were not illegal. This approach
may shape the breadth of Pittsburgh Press' illegal conduct exception.
Had there been evidence of substantial panic selling or that the "For Sale"
signs were a major cause of panic selling, 68 then arguably the ordinance
could have been upheld on the ground that the conduct was subject to
regulation under Pittsburgh Press. If the intent or effect of the "For Sale"
signs was to encourage or facilitate a blockbusting scheme, a practice that
has been declared against public policy and illegal, then under the ration-
ale of Pittsburgh Press the use of "For Sale" signs may not have been a pro-
tected activity.64 The Court, however, chose not to cite the Pittsburgh
57. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 828.
58. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388-89.
59. 421 U.S. at 828 n.14.
60. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
61. Id. at 94-95.
62. Id. at 95.
63. Id. at 95-96.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1976); Barrick Realty, Inc. v. City of Gary, 491
F.2d 161, 163 (7th Cir. 1974). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit observed that "[t]he history of ... [ordinances] banning 'For Sale' signs
shows that... [they were] aimed at panic selling and that... [their] purpose was
[Vol. 46
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss3/2
1981] FIRST AMENDMENT AND ANTITRUST
Press illegal conduct exception, even though the signs purportedly helped
to perpetuate the situation which apparently arose on its own.
Linmark may portend a shift away from a broad reading of the excep-
tion articulated in Pittsburgh Press. Indeed, the Court stated that it was
expressing no view on whether the fower court opinions that cited Pitts-
burgh Press in upholding "For Sale" regulations survived Bigelow's and
Virginia Pharmacy's protection of economic-oriented speech.6, This
ambivalence toward Pittsburgh Press and whether those lower court opi-
nions were still good law is surprising particularly since they found
specifically that the signs were causing "white flight" through
blockbusting. 66
Consequently, the scope of the application of Pittsburgh Press' illegal
conduct exception remains unclear. In neither Linmark nor Pittsburgh
Press was the illegality of the underlying conduct blatant or calculated,
but the results differed. While Pittsburgh Press signaled that the transac-
tion need not be inherently unlawful nor certain to occur for it to come
within the exception, Linmark suggested that before the first amendment
interests are discounted, the connection to an illegal activity must be more
directly or causally linked. Remoteness to the illegality may be the central
factor. With regard to trade regulation, this analysis suggests that before
economic speech can be proscribed there must, at least, be a finding that it
encouraged, promoted, instigated, or facilitated unlawful conduct. In
short, the protection afforded economic speech may depend on the illegal-
ity of the interest served by the speech6 7 and on the closeness of the connec-
tion between the speech and the illegal conduct.
2. Lower-Level Protection and Inapplicability of the
Overbreadth Doctrine
Virginia Pharmacy went beyond the illegal conduct exception in
limiting the applicable scope of the commercial speech. It foreshadowed
to halt resegregation." Id. The court found that the effect of the signs was incon-
sistent with the public policy expressed in the city ordinance and in 42 U.S.C. §
3604(e). Thus, the court held that use of the signs was not protected under. the
first amendment. But, unlike Linmark, the court found evidence in the record
that real estate brokers who used the signs "actively encouraged resegregation by
unlawfully urging whites to sell quickly before they had black neighbors and
lower property values." 491 F.2d at 164. See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (quoting language in Giboney); Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949) ("[I]t has never been deemed an
abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal
merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by
means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.").
65. 431 U.S. at 95 n.9.
66. Id.; 491 F.2d at 163-64.
67. See Terry v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94, 100
(N.D. Cal. 1975); Holiday Magic, Inc. v. Warren, 357 F. Supp. 20 (E.D. Wis.
1973), vacated, 497 F.2d 687 (7th Cir. 1974). 15
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the notion that the traditional first amendment defense of "overbreadth"
would not be available for commercial speech. The Court did so by
holding that commercial speech generally was entitled to less protection
than other speech, and that such a distinction was compelled by certain
qualities, its durability and verifiability, that differentiate commercial
speech from other varieties. Virginia Pharmacy considered commercial
speech hardier than other forms of communication because it is profit-
oriented and because its content is subject to objective product verifica-
tion. Thus, the communication is less likely to be deterred by government
regulation.
The truth of commercial speech, for example, may be more easily
verifiable by its disseminator than... news reporting or political
commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate
information about a specific product or service that he himself
provides and presumably knows more about than anyone else.
Also, commercial speech may be more durable than other kinds.
Since advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is
little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and
forgone entirely. 68
The precise application of this ambiguous logic to economic transactions is
unclear. 69 The Court's reference to "chilling effect," while vague at best,
68. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
69. The Court also has indicated that commercial speech may be distin-
guished from other speech forms in that it may not be entitled to protection under
the prior restraint doctrine. Virginia Pharmacy suggested that the valued con-
stitutional prohibition against prior restraints may be inapplicable to business
communications, again, because of their hardiness and objectivity. Id. No
elaboration was given for this broad statement, nor has any been forthcoming in
subsequent commercial speech decisions. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10
n.9 (1979). But the Virginia Pharmacy Court did cite the 1948 case of Donaldson
v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178, 189-91 (1948), where a prior restraint defense
was rejected on the ground that the order entered enjoined "the continuation of
conduct found fraudulent." See also FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112
(1937); E.F. Drew & Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 969 (1957). By citing Donaldson, the Court seemingly implied that if the
commercial communication is found misleading or deceptive, similar future con-
duct can be enjoined without offending the prior restraint doctrine. But cf. text
accompanying notes 107-20 (argument advanced that Court's underlying
assumptions do not apply in antitrust context). These cases also predated the
adoption of commercial speech protection under the first amendment.
This limited reasoning in the Virginia Pharmacy footnote was not alien to at
least one of the Court's prior commercial speech cases. In Pittsburgh Press, where
the Court rejected a prior restraint defense, the majority opined that by definition
there is no prior restraint once a court has ruled that the practice is unprotected
speech.
The special vice of a prior restraint is that communication will be sup-
pressed, either directly or by inducing excessive caution in the speaker,
532 [Vol. 46
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before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First
Amendment.
The present order [requiring the newspaper to stop arranging adver-
tisements under gender-based categories] does not endanger arguably
protected speech. Because the order is based on a continuing course of
repetitive conduct, this is not a case in which the Court is asked to
speculate as to the effect of publication.
413 U.S. at 390. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Douglas and Stewart were unper-
suaded. Central to their dissent was the conclusion that this order was a classic
prior restraint because it enjoined certain future publications-the very essence
of the prior restraint doctrine. Id. at 396 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 400-04
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
That a prior restraint on speech has carried with it a presumption of un-
constitutionality is, of course, not a new idea. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546 (1975); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organiza-
tion for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). Nor is it out of the mainstream to suggest that
the prior restraint doctrine is a constitutional protection that is extended far
beyond press speech and, therefore, arguably has application in the commercial
speech field. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978);
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971). Thus, it would
seem not an inconsiderable problem for the Court to brush aside so quickly, in
commercial speech cases, the heavy presumption against a prior restraint. This is
particularly true since by definition an order that enjoins future communication
recognized to be protected under the first amendment is a prior restraint. Several
analytical approaches are suggested.
First, as the majority opinion in Pittsburgh Press implied, the vice inherent in
this field is the timing of the restraint; the fact that it is prior to either dissemina-
'tion or judicial determination makes it highly suspect. See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-31, at 725 (1978). When the issue is
whether a judicially entered order enjoining future conduct violates the prior
restraint doctrine, however, Pittsburgh Press dictates that an adequate prior
determination that the underlying conduct or practice was an unprotected com-
munication would render the doctrine inapplicable. Therefore, if an order is
tailored narrowly to proscribe that conduct and its consequences and is based on
a prior determination that the communicative speech was unprotected, then
arguably under Central Hudson and Pittsburgh Press the fact that it prospec-
tively restrained speech would not run afoul of the prohibition against prior
restraint. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 390. Thus, the relationship between the
future repetitive communication and the challenged conduct would not require
courts to speculate about the future effects of the order. The court would be able
to judge beforehand the relationship between the business communication and
the antitrust conduct in determining whether it was protected under the first
amendment and, accordingly, draft a restraining order designed to avoid sweep-
ing in communications unrelated to the illegal practices found. In short, the doc-
trine recognizes a difference between a restraint on speech prior to a judicial
1981] 533
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bespoke the potential inapplication of the constitutional overbreadth doc-
trine to commercial speech. But the Court chose not to support or expand
its expressed assumption that speech is more durable, and thus entitled to
less protection, when motivated by profit. It remained for future cases to
flesh out the exact meaning and application of the intuitive assumptions
underlying Virginia Pharmacy.
The vague overtones of Virginia Pharmacy were first embellished by
the Court's persistent refusal to apply the overbreadth doctrine to com-
mercial speech. Traditionally, overbreadth analysis has not been invoked
to protect constitutionally protected rights of the challenger of the order,
statute, or regulation. Rather, it has been employed to protect third part-
ies not before the court from the sweep of an otherwise overbroad statute,
regulation, or order.7 0 Even though the challenger may not have constitu-
determination and the subsequent order which restrains the speech because it is
related to unlawful conduct.
Moreover, with regard to limits on the availability of injunctive relief that
touches on constitutional issues, courts, by analogy, might consider the distinc-
tions drawn between injunctions against personal defamation and commercial or
trade defamation. The decisional law seems to conclude that commercial libel or
defamation can be enjoined, as an exception to the prior restraint doctrine,
where the communications are a part of an overall scheme to coerce or destroy
business. See Right of Privacy-Availability of Injunctive Relieffor Invasions of
Privacy, 39 Mo. L. REV. 647, 656 (1974). To apply this reasoning as a basis for is-
suing orders that restrict business communications which are related to unlawful
conduct would seem consistent with Pittsburgh Press and Virginia Pharmacy.
Finally, a litigant would seem hard pressed in overcoming the logic that to
allow the prior restraint doctrine to be applied indiscriminately to an order which
prohibits prospective commercial communications linked to antitrust conduct
would make it nearly impossible to enforce the antitrust laws. The enforcement
mechanism of the antitrust laws is generally always through the entry of an
injunctive order prohibiting certain future conduct. See generally II P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 327-30 (1978). The prior restraint doctrine
then should not be applied as strictly in the commercial speech field with regard
to injunctive orders as in other forms of speech, particularly when the order is
issued after a judicial determination.
70. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality opinion);
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U.S. 601 (1973); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Colten v.
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
The litigant who seeks to invoke the overbreadth doctrine in defining the
breadth and scope of an order or decree faces several theoretical and practical
problems. Generally, the doctrine has been applied to the clear, facial terms of a
statute. The reason for this pattern is readily apparent: statutes are applicable to
the population as a whole, so any deterrence to protected speech will find
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tional rights to be asserted or protected, the doctrine permits that party
standing to assert the rights of others not party to the litigation on the
theory that the overly broad reach of the order, statute, or regulation con-
ceivably will deter constitutionally protected speech of third parties, whose
rights will escape judicial review but for the invocation of the doctrine.
Presumably, the existence of a chilling effect will deter the third
party from exercising his rights if he is unable to determine whether his
conduct comes within the sweep of the order, statute, or regulation.
Rather than risk the uncertainty of litigation, the party will refrain from
the conduct in question. An overbroad order, therefore, might deter con-
stitutionally protected business-oriented speech, a result at odds with the
fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws and trade regulations, which
are designed to promote competition on the merits. To alleviate this prob-
lem, the litigant who may not have first amendment rights to be protected
is given standing to raise the overbreadth analysis as a defense for others.
Once this problem of standing is solved, the law is then scrutinized on its
face for potentially overbroad intrusions on protected speech which, if
found, provide a basis to strike the law as unconstitutional. The net result
is that a defendant being prosecuted under an overbroad order, statute, or
regulation may avoid liability by asserting the first amendment rights of
others, although the conduct with which he is charged could have been
prohibited constitutionally by a more narrowly drawn law. The standing
issue, otherwise grounds for summary rejection of the constitutional
defense, is resolved by the existence of a chilling effect on third parties in
their exercise of protected activities.
The application of an overbreadth analysis as a defense to government
regulation of economic speech first surfaced in Bigelow. Bigelow, the
managing editor, argued that Virginia's statute, which made it a misde-
meanor to encourage through publication or other means the procuring of
an abortion, was facially overbroad. The Virginia courts had ruled that,
since commercial advertisements were unprotected,'7 1 the editor lacked
standing to challenge a statute on overbreadth grounds because he lacked
a legitimate first amendment interest. Although the statute was amended
to correct the overbroad coverage after Bigelow was charged, thus
mooting the issue on appeal before the Supreme Court, the Court indi-
cated that it would be receptive to entertaining overbreadth challenges in
commercial speech cases.72 Indeed, the Court observed that the Virginia
courts erred in denying Bigelow standing to raise the overbreadth argu-
ment.73
numerous targets. An order, however, is limited generally to the parties before
the court; its unconstitutional impact will be limited. But see notes 107-20 and
accompanying text infra (FTC cease and desist orders may apply to all who have
knowledge of their terms).
71. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 814-18.
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A retreat was apparent, however, when the Virginia Pharmacy Court
commented that the durability of commercial speech made it unlikely that
it would be deterred by government regulation. The Court in Bates v.
State Bar74 seemed to recede further from the application of the over-
breadth doctrine to commercial speech, and in so doing implicitly reaf-
firmed that purely economic-oriented speech is only entitled to reduced
protection because it is constitutionally distinguishable from political or
pure speech. It observed that the justification for its application in the
business context is at best weak. 75 Citing Virginia Pharmacy, Bates com-
mented that "[s]ince advertising is linked to commercial well-being, it
seems unlikely that such speech is particularly susceptible to being crushed
by overbroad regulation. ' 76 Moreover, because the commercial message is
directed at a service, the Court reasoned that the advertiser is in a position
to know the truthfulness of the communication and would not refrain from
advertising for fear that the communication was unprotected because it
was untruthful. The Court declined, therefore, to apply the overbreadth
doctrine to professional advertising,77 and by implication to other types of
commercial speech.
In two subsequent cases, the Court held that regulations on lawyers' in-
person solicitations for economic gain are entitled to even less first amend-
ment scrutiny than advertising. First in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Associa-
tion,78 and then in In re Primus,79 the Court returned to a balancing test,
indicating that a solicitation which had an economic motivation would
receive less constitutional protection than solicitation which was politically
oriented or which furthered a political expression.
In Ohralik, the Court refined the assumptions that underlieiits unwill-
ingness to apply the overbreadth doctrine to commercial speech. Because
of the commercial speech qualities identified in Virginia Pharmacy, which
make it different than pure speech, the Court reasoned that it "is not as
74. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). In Bates, the Court ruled that a state may not, con-
sistent with first amendment constitutional values, prohibit price advertising for
routine legal services. The advertisement in Bates offered legal services for "very
reasonable fees" and listed prices for certain routine lawyering services. Id. at
385.
75. Id. at 380.
76. Id. at 381.
77. Id.
78. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). In Ohralik, a lawyer had solicited legal employ-
ment from two accident victims, one while still a patient in the hospital. The
Court made it clear that it would distinguish between the Bates legal service price
advertising and in-person solicitation for an economic gain. Id. at 455.
79. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). In Primus, an ACLU lawyer solicitated a client for
reasons of political advocacy rather than pecuniary gain. The Court held that
nonprofit-motivated communication was entitled to more first amendment pro-
tection than the profit-motivated conduct found in Ohralik. Id. at 426-32.
Neither, however, was to receive full protection. Id. at 438-39.
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likely to be deterred as noncommercial speech."80 If the speech is not likely
to be chilled, it "does not require the added protection afforded by the
overbreadth approach."8 1 But in contrast to Bates, the Court did not
foreclose the argument entirely. It observed that if the doctrine did have
application, it would have to be shown that the overbreadth of the regula-
tion was both real and substantial.8 2
This same equivocal tone was expressed a year later in Friedman v.
Rogers,83 where the Court upheld a Texas regulation prohibiting the prac-
tice of optometry under a trade name. A total ban on use of trade names in
that practice was constitutionally acceptable, the Court reasoned, because,
notwithstanding the constitutional gains made in the commercial speech
context, it was a reasonable regulation of the form of commercial informa-
tion concerning a professional service. By regulating the form of the infor-
mation, the state could avoid deception in the use of the trade name. In
upholding the regulation, the Court rejected, without elaboration, the no-
tion that more traditional first amendment defenses such as overbreadth
analysis or prohibitions on prior restraints should be extended automat-
ically to the commercial speech protections.8 4
Consequently, while the Court is reluctant to apply the first amend-
ment overbreadth doctrine in the context of commercial speech,8 5 it seems
to have left the door open for future invocation of the doctrine should the
proper circumstances arise.
D. A Structured Approach
One reading of the commercial speech cases through Friedman could
lead to the conclusion that the Court, through its ad hoc approach, lacked
80. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462 n.20.
81. Id.
82. Id. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (imposed re-
quirement that overbreadth be substantial); notes 125-27 and accompanying text
infra.
83. 440 U.S. 1 (1979). In Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980), the Court also equivocated on whether the
overbreadth doctrine was inapplicable in commercial speech cases. Although the
speech in question was found not to be commercial, the Court cited Bates for the
proposition that the overbreadth doctrine was "inapplicable in certain commer-
cial speech cases." Id. at 634 (emphasis added).
84. 440 U.S. at 10 n.9. Because there was substantial potential that the
trade name with its close association "with price and quality information" could
mislead the consumer, the Court had little difficulty in upholding the regulation
over a commercial speech argument. Id. at 12-13.
85. This hesitation in applying the doctrine to commercial speech coincides
chronologically with the Court's general reluctance to invoke the doctrine at all.
See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality opinion); Lewis v. City of
New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973);
notes 125-42 and accompanying text infra.
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a doctrinal framework in which to analyze first amendment defenses in
commercial speech cases. Certainly Bigelow, Virginia Pharmacy, and
Bates seem to stand on surer footing than the more recent decisions of
Ohralik and Friedman, where the Court seemed ready to subordinate sig-
nificantly the protection afforded commercial speech whenever there was
the potential for overreaching or deception. As Friedman indicated, the
risk alone was enough for the Court to concede any protection.86
This equivocal attitude toward a structured approach to the applica-
tion of first amendment defenses within the commercial speech doctrine
changed, however, in the recent decision of CentralHudson Gas &Electric
Co. v. Public Service Commission.87 The case is instructive, particularly in
the trade regulation context, because the Court applied a systematic con-
stitutional approach in reviewing an overbroad regulatory order. In Cen-
tral Hudson, the New York Public Service Commission issued an order
prohibiting the promotional advertising of the use of electricity. The state
interest underlying the ban centered on energy conservation because there
was an energy supply shortage. After the energy shortage ended, the pro-
motional ban continued, but the regulations permitted informational
advertising designed to encourage time shifts in energy consumption. Cen-
tral Hudson, a public utility, challenged the promotional ban, arguing
that it violated the commercial speech doctrine. 8 The New York Court of
Appeals upheld the ban on the theory that there was "little value to adver-
tising in 'the noncompetitive market in which electric corporations
operate.' "89 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ban violated
Central Hudson's commercial speech rights.
After noting that the cornerstone of the commercial speech doctrine
was based on the informational function of the communication, the Court
established a four-tiered analysis for scrutinizing regulations and orders
which restrict commercial speech. First, it must be decided whether the
speech is protected, i.e., whether it is commercial speech that is accurate
and unrelated to illegal conduct.90 If it is inaccurate or related to illegal
conduct, then it is entitled to little constitutional protection.9 1 But if it is
not deceptive and does not encourage illegal activity, it can be regulated
only if: second, the regulating authority has a substantial interest to be
86. 440 U.S. at 19-20 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
87. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
88. Id. at 560.
89. Id. at 561 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 47
N.Y.2d 94, 110, 390 N.E.2d 749, 757, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30, 39 (1979), rev'd sub
nom. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980)).
90. 447 U.S. at 563, 566.
91. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Ohralikv. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447 (1978); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
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served by the regulation; third, the restriction on the speech advances
directly the stated governmental interest;92 and fourth, the restriction is
not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. 93
The application of this new unitary test in Central Hudson to the
challenged order banning promotional advertising resulted in the order
being struck down. 94 In addressing whether New York had a substantial
92. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
93. 447 U.S. at 564-66. The Court cited In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438-39
(1978), for the proposition that under the commercial speech doctrine the
government restriction must be drawn as narrowly as possible to withstand con-
stitutional analysis. But in Primus that rule was articulated in the context of
political expression or association, not necessarily within the commercial speech
doctrine. Restriction of political speech receives stricter scrutiny than restrictions
of other types of speech. It is allowed only when necessary to advance a compel-
ling state interest. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516, 524 (1960). Once a compelling interest is shown, however, the test is the
same: the restriction must be no broader than necessary to effectuate the interest.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See notes 45-46 & 54 and accom-
panying text supra. Thus, the only apparent distinction between the test
employed in political speech cases and the test employed in commercial speech
cases is that in the former the interest advanced by the government must be
greater, e.g., compelling, while in the latter the interest need only be substantial.
Otherwise the analysis is similar. See note 99 infra.
The Central Hudson Court for the first time was extending this well-accepted
first amendment constitutional defense to the commercial speech doctrine. See
generally United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In O'Brien, the Court, in
discussing cases that contain elements of speech and conduct, said that "govern-
ment regulation is sufficiently justified if it... furthers an important or substan-
tial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression; and if the indicental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest." Id. at 377 (emphasis added).
94. 447 U.S. at 566-71. Central Hudson's advertisements were not alleged to
be either inaccurate or related to an unlawful activity. Id. at 566. See Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
The Court also rejected the reasoning of the New York courts that the speech
sought to be protected had little value because the public utility had a monopoly
over the supply and thus that "advertising in a 'noncompetitive market' could not
improve the decisionmaking of consumers." 447 U.S. at 566-67. Finding that
monopolistic and regulated utilities would not advertise unless there was some
informational or promotional content that might be useful to the public and con-
sumers in the decisionmaking process, the Court held that commercial speech by
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interest in saving energy, the Court found that goal imperative and that
the order banning promotional advertisements directly served that inter-
est.9 5 The order, however, was found to be constitutionally overbroad
because it had the effect of reaching "all promotional advertising,
regardless of the impact," 96 and would have suppressed the promotion of
information about electric devices or services that promote efficiency.9 7
The burden was placed on the regulatory authority to demonstrate that a
more limited, less sweeping order would not protect adequately the
governmental interest.9 8
Although Central Hudson synthesizes several previously announced
prerequisites for regulation, it nevertheless was evasive on several issues.
First, how closely related must the commercial speech be to illegal conduct
before the speech is not entitled to protection? Second, how substantial
must the governmental interest be? Third, how directly must the restric-
tion advance the governmental interest? Finally, how narrowly must the
order be drawn? Although the Court has indicated that it will address
these questions only on a case-by-case basis, some observations are war-
ranted.
First, Central Hudson quantifies, to a degree, the substantiality stan-
dard derived from the balancing test first imposed in Bigelow. Regulatory
authorities must establish that the governmental interest advanced is
substantial,9 9 and that the order directly advances that interest.' 00 Second,
95. 447 U.S. at 568-69.
96. Id. at 570.
97. Id. But see id. at 602-04 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 570-71.
99. Apparently, the substantiality test requires an "intermediate level of
scrutiny," somewhere between the rational relationship test and the compelling
governmental interest test. See note 93 supra. Justice Blackmun would accept this
intermediate level of scrutiny only when there was evidence that the speech was
misleading, coercive, or to regulate time, place, and manner restrictions. 447
U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring). But if the speech is commercial and does
not fall within these categories, he believes it can only be regulated when there is
evidence of a clear and present danger. Id. at 575 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Contra, Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Friedman v. Rogers,
440 U.S. 1 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
Prior to Central Hudson, the Court had not considered expressly the govern-
mental interest in terms of a substantiality standard, although in Bates, for exam-
ple, it discussed at length the asserted state interest and found it insufficient.
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 368-79 (1977). See also Linmark Assocs., Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94-97 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 766-70 (1976).
100. In both Linmark and Virginia Pharmacy, the governmental regulations
were found constitutionally infirm because they were not necessary to achieve the
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if the substantiality and relation tests are met, the government can, consis-
tent with first amendment values, regulate the content of the commercial
speech.1 01 Third, the government has a formidable burden to demonstrate
affirmatively that the order as drawn is no broader than necessary to
achieve the interest advanced.
This traditional first amendment defense, that a regulation or order
be no more extensive than necessary, had not been applied previously in
purely business-oriented speech cases. While there were vague signals in
Primus and First National Bank v. Bellotti'02 that this defense was applica-
ble, those cases were decided largely in the context of the political expres-
sions which played a central role in the commercial solicitation involved. 103
The requirement that an order be no broader than necessary to
achieve a governmental interest could be the most litigated requirement in
trade regulation litigation. It mandates that the order can "extend only as
far as the interest it serves.' u04 If a less restrictive order will suffice to pro-
tect that interest, the order must be tailored to protect only the substantial
governmental interest promoted. In other words, to support an order the
government must demonstrate that alternative means which would
burden or impair the defendant less are unavailable.
According to Central Hudson, the mandate that orders be narrowly
drawn and be as unintrusive as possible is distinguishable from the first
amendment overbreadth doctrine. 10 5 Traditional overbreadth analysis
was not applicable in Central Hudson, the Court reasoned, because the
challenged order acted directly against the activities of Central Hudson,
and, therefore, the chilling effect on third parties was not in issue. Because
Central Hudson could argue on its behalf that the order directly affected
its own constitutionally protected rights, there was no need to invoke third-
party overbreadth analysis. 0 6
101. The content-based regulation, for example, could take the form of re-
quiring the communicator to include, inter alia, efficacy and price information
and prescreening approval. 447 U.S. at 571 n.13. The Court was careful to point
out that the content-based regulation was permissible in the commercial speech
cases because of the subordinate protection it is afforded under the first amend-
ment, as distinguished from other forms of expression. Id. at 562-63.
102. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See note 93 supra.
103. 447 U.S. at 565.
104. Id. See Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 618-19 (3d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977); National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC,
570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); Warner-Lambert
Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978);
Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 364 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
105. 447 U.S. at 565 n.8. In footnote 14 the Court noted that, given the
resolution of the challenge on first amendment grounds, it specifically declined to
address the claims that the order also was violative of the equal protection clause
and that it was overbroad and vague. Id. at 571 n.14.
106. Id. at 565 n.8.
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The Court's approach suggests that the overbreadth doctrine as tradi-
tionally invoked may be inapplicable as a defense, although the order is
overbroad in the sense that it is more extensive than necessary to serve the
governmental interest. If this is true, the doctrine may not be transposed
into a "single-party" analysis where the challenging party specifically at-
tempts to invoke the doctrine by complaining that its own constitutional
rights are affected. Therefore, one reading of CentralHudson may suggest
that for a specific order challenged by a defendant whose rights are af-
fected, the appropriate measure of the order's breadth is not whether it
will have a deterrent or chilling effect, but whether it is broader than ne-
cessary to achieve the governmental interests. Under this reading of Cen-
tral Hudson, the utility of the chilling effect concept in a single-party
challenge is suspect.
III. APPLICABILITY OF THE OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE AND
VAGUENESS -SUMMARY AND CRITICISM
A. Third-Party Overbreadth
Although the Court indicated in Virginia Pharmacy and Bates that
the overbreadth analysis was inapplicable to commercial speech, the
assumption that commercial speech is more easily verifiable than other
types of speech and less susceptible to being chilled by overbroad regula-
tion, arguably has little weight in the antitrust context. The type of regula-
tion that the Court had in mind when it made this assumption was regula-
tion based on the truth or falsity of advertising. According to this ration-
ale, the speaker supposedly would know whether the information was true
and would be deterred only from making false statements, which were un-
protected anyway. The knowledge that his communication was in fact true
would serve to soothe any fears he might have of subsequent prosecution,
so his protected speech would not be chilled.
In the antitrust context of price information disclosures, however,
regulation of speech often is not based on the truth or falsity of the com-
munication. Price information will be disclosed generally for informa-
tional or promotional purposes. The justification for refusing to apply the
overbreadth doctrine then becomes inapplicable. An order with an overly
broad reach might render a defendant uncertain as to which of his com-
munications fall within the proscribed area. As a consequence of that
uncertainty, he may avoid engaging in various types of business-oriented
speech, which in fact are protected but which he fears are prohibited. For
instance, if a manufacturer is unable to communicate price information
and policies to potential customers generally through trade publications or
press releases, competition for the solicitation of customers could suffer.
Moreover, a scarcity of market information relevant to production, costs,
and price data may serve as a barrier to entry for new competition. As a
result, competition among sellers will diminish.
The direct application of this theory can be seen in the adoption of a
542 [Vol. 46
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recent statute. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B) was enacted as part of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty -Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act. 10 7 It grants to the Commission the power to assess penalties on any
person who, with actual knowledge, 0 8 violates a final cease and desist
order,10 9 even though that person was not a party in the proceeding from
which the cease and desist order arose. In practice, every cease and desist
order of the FTC which declares any act or practice to be unfair or decep-
tive is binding on any person who has actual knowledge of the terms of the
order. 110
Although the FTC has not yet invoked this provision,"' its potential
effect is patent. Its application will impart the broad scope of a statute on a
cease and desist order of the FTC. An order could have a chilling effect on
the protected commercial speech of its potential subjects. Third parties
could be deterred from speech by the fear of prosecution and severe penal-
ty. 112 Therefore, the actual litigant should, under an overbreadth analysis,
be allowed to assert constitutionally protected rights of third parties. 113 If a
107. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 45-46, 49-50, 52, 56-58, 2301-2312 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B)(2) (1976).
109. Id. § 45(m)(1)(B)(1).
110. The statute provides that, if the Commission applies an order to a third
party, the issues of fact in the proceeding shall be tried de novo. Id. §
45(m)(1)(C)(2). Presumably, the prior finding that the conduct in question was
unfair or deceptive is a question of law and, therefore, not subject to relitigation.
See Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 294 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1961);
Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668
(1941). Thus, it would seem that the issues tried de novo would be limited to
whether the conduct fell within the scope of the prior order.
111. There are no cases arising under this statute. It would appear that, for
whatever reason, the Commission has chosen not to invoke the statute.
112. The statute provides for penalties of up to $10,000 per day. 15 U.S.C. §
45(m)(1)(B)-(C) (1976). The possible consequences of this statute are overwhelm-
ing. The Commission issues many cease and desist orders. A business enterprise, if
it keeps in touch with what the Commission is doing, will acquire actual
knowledge of these orders and become bound by them as if the orders were
statutes or rules. Its only alternative is purposely to ignore what the Commission is
doing. That is equally unsatisfactory because it leaves the enterprise with no
knowledge of the principles which likely will be invoked to govern its conduct.
There is no middle ground where it may make a good faith attempt to comply, yet
avoid immediate liability for an inadvertent misstep.
113. The argument that an order of the FTC is overly broad is a difficult one
to impress on the courts. The specific standard of review for such an order is that
"the courts will not interfere except where the remedy selected has no reasonable
relation to the unlawful practices found to exist." FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
380 U.S. 374, 394-95 (1965) (footnote omitted).
As a result of this broad standard, the Commission is not reluctant to issue
orders which extend far beyond the unlawful acts shown to have occurred ")rders
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court found that widespread application of the order would result in
punishment of protected speech, enough to constitute "substantial over-
breadth,114 the order should be struck down.
Critical to this analysis is the development of a protected status under
the first amendment for commercial speech. The speech must merit con-
stitutional protection before courts will waive the requirements of standing
for a party asserting rights of others. Only since the post-1975
developments in commercial speech n1 5 has any such protection been forth-
coming to the kind of speech in question here. Once the standing require-
ment has been satisfied by a showing of deterred speech, the commercial
often extend to other products, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374
(1965); AMA v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980); Jay Norris, Inc. v. FTC, 598
F.2d 1244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979); Carter Prods., Inc. v.
FTC, 323 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1963); Benrus Watch Co. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 313 (8th
Cir. 1965). Orders also have extended to other types of conduct, e.g., Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Rubbermaid, Inc. v.
FTC, 575 F.2d 1169 (6th Cir. 1978), and to unrelated geographic divisions of or
activities within the defendant's operation, e.g., FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
363 U.S. 536 (1960); Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 971 (2d Cir.
1977), rev'd on other grounds, 440 U.S. 69 (1979); Bankers Sec. Corp. v. FTC,
297 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1961); Grove Labs. v. FTC, 418 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1969);
National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 979 (1968).
The circuit courts, however, since the recognition of commercial speech pro-
tection, have increased their scrutiny of regulatory orders. See, e.g., ITT Con-
tinental Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976); Beneficial Corp. v.
FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 618-19 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977);
American Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1968); National
Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 821 (1978); Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 411 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1969); Standard Oil
Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 661-63 (9th Cir. 1978); Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC,
562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978); Chrysler Corp.
v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Recently, in In re Litton Indus., Inc., No. 9123 (F.T.C. Jan. 5, 1981), the
Commission, in marked contrast to prior decisions, narrowed the scope of its own
order when it rejected a staff appeal to apply a cease and desist order to all of Lit-
ton's consumer products, not merely to microwave ovens. The staff had charged
that Litton's microwave advertising was misleading under § 5 of the FTC Act. In
rejecting the broad order, the Commision stated:
The practices involved in this case related solely to microwave ovens
and Litton has not been shown to have engaged in similar practices in
connection with any other product .... [I]t is well established that a
cease and desist order must bear a reasonable relationship to the prac-
tices found to be violative of the Act in each case.
Id., quoted in 997 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-16 (Jan. 15, 1981).
114. See Broadrickv. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973); notes 125-27 and
accompanying text infra.
115. See notes 23-55 and accompanying text supra.
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speech doctrine further serves to heighten the level of scrutiny applied to
the actual breadth of the order.1 1 6 In short, an order encroaching on pro-
tected speech must survive the stricter examination which is inherent
whenever the first amendment is invoked successfully.
Equally crucial to the vitality of this analysis is repudiation of the con-
cept, first espoused in Virginia Pharmacy, that commercial speech is hard-
ier and more durable than other speech. 1 17 As previously noted,18 two
assumptions underlie this argument: first, commercial speech is more easi-
ly verifiable, and thus less likely to be chilled by regulation based on
truthfulness; second, since advertising is the sine qua non of profits and
essential to commercial success, it is so strongly motivated as to survive any
chilling effect which may in fact arise. The fallacy of these assumptions is
poignant especially in the present context. First, FTC cease and desist
orders are directed frequently toward aspects of commercial activity
unrelated to truthfulness, such as when the Commission procedes under
the "unfairness" portion of section 5 of the FTC Act." 9 Therefore, the fact
that commercial speech may be verifiable more easily often will fail to
insulate it from the chilling effect of an overbroad order. Second, the
severity of penalty under the statute120 may push to the breaking point the
notion that profit motive will surmount the chilling effect. Although a
large, thriving business enterprise may be willing and able to risk such a
loss, the economically smaller or less successful business may not. Yet the
116. "'Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive,
government may regulate in this area only with narrow specificity.' " In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432-33 (1978) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
433 (1963)).
117. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
118. See notes 68-85 and accompanying text supra.
119. The Commission is charged with prevention of "[u]nfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976). While "deceptive" generally
is directed at the element of truthfulness, see, e.g., Jay Norris, Inc. v. FTC, 598
F.2d 1244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979); Encyclopaedia Britan-
nica, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934
(1980), the "unfair" portion of the statute may be directed at various types of con-
duct unrelated to truthfulness. A common example is an order to cease and desist
from price discrimination. See, e.g., FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360
(1962); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952); National Dairy Prods. Corp.
v. FTC, 412 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1969); Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, Inc. v. FTC, 347
F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also Rubbermaid, Inc. v. FTC, 575 F.2d 1169 (6th
Cir. 1978) (order to cease and desist from resale price maintenance); Hamilton
Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 194 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (order to cease and desist from
sale of devices to be used in a lottery or game of chance).
120. The penalty imposed may be up to $10,000 per violation. 15 U.S.C. §
45(m)(1)(B) (1976). Each day of continued conduct shall be treated as a separate
violation. Id. § 45(m)(1)(C).
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orders will apply equally to the large and the small, the strong and the
weak. Moreover, the economically small and weak, who are the most likely
to be chilled, are also the most in need of efficacious commercial com-
munication to enhance their competitive position. Thus, the chilling ef-
fect which does result falls on those whose business can tolerate it the least.
Their already inferior competitive position would be eroded further by the
paralysis of commercial communicative activity, paralysis induced by the
fear of violating an order previously imposed on another party or com-
petitor.
B. Single-Party Overbreadth
As Central Hudson indicated, traditional overbreadth may be inap-
plicable where the party before a court is asserting that the order directly
affected its own constitutional rights.121 It is unclear, however, whether
such reasoning is compelled logically. First, the Court has suggested,
although contrary to its specific holding, that the overbreadth doctrine has
application even in those instances where the challenger of the order has a
constitutional right at stake. This additional invocation of the doctrine
was noted implicitly when the Court observed that the doctrine "permits
the invalidation of regulations [or orders] on First Amendment grounds
even when the litigant challenging the regulation [or order] has engaged in
no constitutionally protected activity."'122 Inferentially, the use of the
words "even when" suggests the existence of protection in the single-party
context when the challenger's own constitutional rights are at stake.
Traditional overbreadth analysis should remain a significant ground
on which to strike an overly broad order which infringes on or has the
potential of deterring constitutionally protected, truthful commercial
communications of the challenging party, such as Central Hudson's pro-
motion of efficient energy alternatives. 123 The mere fact that the
challenger of the order is subject to some regulation for activity outside the
ambit of protection should not serve to prohibit it from challenging an
order which has the effect of chilling other constitutionally protected com-
mercial communications. Especially pertinent in this single-party situa-
tion is the chilling effect that will result from the order's vagueness. 124 The
party subject to the order will refrain from engaging in certain conduct
because the terms of the order leave uncertain whether that conduct is pro-
hibited. Thus, while Central Hudson seemingly discourages a single-party
overbreadth challenge, it opens the door to a vagueness attack with the
same theoretical basis.
121. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565 n.8. See notes 105 & 106 and accom-
panying text supra.
122. 447 U.S. at 565 n.8 (emphasis added).
123. See note 97 and accompanying text supra.
124. See note 137 and accompanying text infra.
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Assuming the validity of single-party overbreadth analysis, distinctions
between the "broader than necessary" test and the chilling effect approach
should be emphasized and retained. As an evidentiary concern, it would
seem more difficult for a party to prove, in rebuttal to the government's
burden of establisshing the contrary, that an order will have a chilling
effect than to demonstrate that the order is broader than necessary to serve
the substantial interest involved. Proof of chilling effect on protected con-
duct should be sufficient to prove that it was not the least intrusive govern-
mental regulation possible or that it is broader than necessary, while the
converse would not be true. Therefore, the "broader than necessary" test
would seem to impose a less onerous burden. Hence, although the chal-
lenger of the order might be able to point to the potential existence of a
chilling effect, it would not want this higher evidentiary standard to be
adopted as the threshold standard of appropriate breadth of an order.
C. Retreat from the Overbreadth Doctrine
Although the doctrinal soundness of the overbreadth doctrine seems
unassailable, recent developments in the Supreme Court raise practical
questions about the proper scope of its application. At the same time,
some erosion of the doctrine is apparent.
Broadrick v. Oklahoma125 marked a shift in the Court's approach to
the overbreadth doctrine. Broadrick imposed the requirement that "par-
ticularly *here conduct and not merely speech is involved .... the over-
breadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged
in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." 126 Therefore, before a
statute, order, or regulation can be struck down under an overbreadth
analysis, the overbreadth must be substantial. In Broadrick, where a state
statute limited political campaigning by state employees, the term was
stated perfunctorily and applied;12 7 its precise meaning in this context re-
125. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
126. Id. at 615. Appellants, employees of the Oklahoma Corporation Com-
mission, were charged with violation of a state statute which severely limited
political campaigning by state employees. They sought an injunction against en-
forcement of the statute on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad, arguing, inter alia, that it could be, and in fact had been, interpreted
to prohibit such things as wearing political buttons or displaying bumper stickers.
Id. at 609-10. See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 n.20
(1978).
127. Justice Brennan noted in dissent that
the Court makes no effort to define what it means by "substantial over-
breadth.". . . [A] requirement of substantial overbreadth is already im-
plicit in the doctrine .... Whether the Court means to require some dif-
ferent or greater showing of substantiality is left obscure by today's opin-
ion, in large part because the Court makes no effort to explain why the
overbreadth of the Oklahoma Act, while real, is somehow not quite
substantial.
413 U.S. at'630-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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mains unilluminated by subsequent decisions. The practical effect of this
development remains uncertain. At least, Broadrick seems to signal that
the present Court was reluctant to dilate the scope of the doctrine. Further
evidence also indicates a possible desire by the Court to constrict it.
In Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 28 where a majority struck down a city
ordinance prohibiting the use of abusive language as unconstitutionally
overb'road,129 several members of the Court indicated strongly their
hostility to the overbreadth doctrine. Justice Blackmun, joined by Chief
Justice Burger andJustice Rehnquist, found that the function of the Court
under the doctrine had been reduced to "parsing words in the context of
imaginary events. '"" The dissent noted that "[o]verbreadth ...in the
field of speech... [has] become [a] result-oriented rubberstamp .... The
more frequent our intervention, ... the more we usurp the prerogative of
democratic government. Instead of applying constitutional limitations, we
do become a 'council of revision.' ,,3
The Lewis dissent suggested further that any chilling effect or over-
breadth should be weighed against the interest served by the regulation.1 2
Implicit in this language is the belief that a mere finding of chilling effect
on protected speech of third parties is not enough; its effect must be
balanced against competing interests. This balancing test could supple-
ment the Broadrick requirement that the overbreadth be "substantial...
in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."' 33 In short, under this
approach a balancing of both effects and interests may be required.
D. Relationship Between Overbreadth and Vagueness
Although Broadrick and the Lewis dissent portend change in tradi-
tional overbreadth analysis, subsequent cases to date have not advanced
the apparent move toward interest balancing. Rather, in Arnett v. Ken-
nedy,13 4 the Court engaged in statutory construction which, if applied
with regularity, could sound the demise of overbreadth analysis. The
128. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
129. Appellant challenged a city ordinance making it unlawful" 'to curse or
revile or to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to' "a
police officer while in the performance of his duties. Id. at 132 (quoting NEW
ORLEANS, LA., ORDINANCES 828 MCS § 49-7 (1969)). A majority of the Court
found this language facially overbroad and unconstitutional because it swept
broader than the "fighting words" doctrine. Id. at 132. See Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S 518, 522 (1972) (discussion of fighting words doctrine); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (fighting words doctrine announced
and defined).
130. 415 U.S. at 137 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 140 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
132. Id. at 136-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. 413 U.S. at 615. See notes 125-27 and accompanying text supra.
134. 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality opinion).
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respondent, who had been fired from a Civil Service job, contended that
"although no constitutionally protected conduct of his own was the basis
for his discharge .... the... [statute]... must be declared inoperative...
because the generality of its language might result in marginal situations
in which other persons seeking to engage in constitutionally protected con-
duct would be deterred from doing so."135 Although the Court recognized
this vintage overbreadth argument, it rejected the claim with a finding
that Congress "obviously did not intend to authorize discharge ... for
speech which is constitutionally protected.'13 6 The Court declared the
doctrine inapplicable when a limiting construction has the effect of nar-
rowing the regulations' scope from an otherwise overbroad reach. Thus,
the apparent overbreadth of the statute dissolves magically with a con-
struction that excludes from its scope any constitutionally protected con-
duct. As Professor Tribe has pointed out, however, this construction leaves
the statute patently vague, given the difficulty of predicting in advance
what is and is not constitutionally protected. 3 7 Protected speech is chilled,
not by overbreadth since the statute "excludes constitutionally protected
speech," but by the vagueness reflected in the prospective speaker's inabi-
lity to guess whether his speech will be subject to that protection and fall
outside the statute's ban. The individual contemplating speech which ap-
pears to fall within the ambit of the regulation, but which may be deserv-
ing of first amendment protection, is in the same quandary as before. He is
faced with the difficult choice of refraining from the speech and avoiding
prosecution, or speaking his mind and incurring liability if a court later
determines the speech to be unprotected.
Vagueness as a doctrine had its origin in the due process clause. It rests
on concepts of fair notice and warning. As the Supreme Court cautioned
early, if a regulation "forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its mean-
ing and differ as to its application," then it is constitutionally infirm. 3 If
the prohibitions are not clearly defined or if reasonably clear guidelines
are lacking, the regulation cannot stand. 3 9
135. Id. at 163. Respondent was fired pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a) (1970),
which allowed discharge only for "such cause as will promote the efficiency of the
service." He contended that that language could support discharge for constitu-
tionally protected speech and thus was overbroad and vague.
136. 416 U.S. at 162.
137. L. TRIBE, supra note 69, § 12-26, at 716.
138. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). See Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
108 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); Dombrowski
v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964);
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
726-27 (1978).
139. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
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Recently, the "void for vagueness" defense has evolved into a concept
with broader constitutional application. Although the vagueness doctrine
is theoretically applicable to regulations of any substantive nature, it is en-
forced more vigorously if the regulation invades the province of the first
amendment. Courts have noted that if the regulation "abut[s] upon sen-
sitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms, 1 4 0 it will receive closer
scrutiny under the watchful eye of the first amendment. Indeed, if con-
duct that is to be regulated comes within the bounds of the first amend-
ment, the regulations may be required to be drawn more specifically than
under due process standards. 14 1 Consequently, since business communica-
tions have been elevated to a level that warrants first amendment protec-
tion, the vagueness defense under both due process and first amendment
analysis becomes available. They are, however, separate and distinct
analyses. 4 2 For instance, a regulation can be overbroad, but its language
clearly defined so as not to be vague. On the other hand, a regulation can
suffer from ambiguous language, but not be overbroad either because it
was drafted narrowly or because of a limiting or narrowing interpretation.
Vagueness, at least before the advent of commercial speech protec-
tion, had proved less a problem when invoked against an order of the FTC
because the FTC allows anyone subject to its order to "request advice from
the Commission as to whether a proposed course of action, if pursued by it,
will constitute compliance with such order.... [T]he Commission will in-
form the respondent whether or not the proposed course of action, if pur-
sued, would constitute compliance with its order."'' 43 Most courts have
been willing to accept this opportunity for an "advisory opinion" as an ade-
quate cure for vagueness of an FTC order.144 A few courts, however, have
been unwilling to accept this argument: "[T]his suggestion does not reach
the core of the problem. The vice inherent in ... [this] order lies.., in the
requirement that one who is subject to its terms must 'either expose his
140. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964). See Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566, 573 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972);
United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963); Levy v.
Parker, 478 F.2d 772, 789, 793 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975).
141. See Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772, 793 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 972 (1975).
142. Vagueness is often closely related to overbreadth. It is a rare case where
one is asserted without the other. A statute may be found unconstitutionally
vague when, as with overbreadth, it chills protected speech. Such chilling effect
may occur when the statutory language is s rimprecise as to leave one unable con-
fidently to discern what it means. "Those... sensitive to the perils posed by the
... indefinite language, avoid the risk... only by restricting their conduct to
that which is unquestionably safe." Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
143. 16 C.F.R. § 2.41(d) (1980).
144. E.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 394 (1965); Jay Nor-
ris, Inc. v. FTC, 598 F.2d 1244, 1251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979);
Fedders Corp. v. FTC, 529 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976).
550 [Vol. 46
34
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss3/2
FIRST AMENDMENT AND ANTITRUST
major business decisions to a Commission veto, or remain in the dark
regarding their legal consequences.' 14
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Arnett, which was joined by a majority
of the present Court, 14 6 neatly avoided discussion of the vagueness prob-
lem which, under traditional analysis, would have rendered the statute in
question constitutionally infirm. Fundamental to the Arnett opinion,
however, is a principle that often has frustrated clear analysis. An
analytical distinction should be maintained between chilling effect, over-
breadth, and vagueness. Although not mutually exclusive, these concepts
are consecutive, rather than concurrent, analytical steps. The finding of a
chilling effect does not serve automatically to strike the statute as unconsti-
tutional; it merely allows the defendant to avoid summary rejection of his
defense for lack of standing. Once that feat is achieved, the challenger
must continue to prove that the regulation encroaches on protected
speech. Proof of mere chilling effect might not be sufficient in itself to
fulfill this requirement because that chill is purely subjective; it is based on
the person's fearful assumption that the regulation may be or will be in-
voked against him. If that assumption is or had been rendered erroneous
by judicial interpretation to the contrary then, under Arnett, the regula-
tion survives. 147 On the other hand, if the challenger demonstrates that the
145. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 661-62 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting
Joseph A. Kaplan & Sons, Inc. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 785, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
These opinions seem to be based on the fact that the defendant was only minimal-
ly culpable and the order severely vague or broad. See also AMA v. FTC, 638
F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980).
146. Justice Rehnquist was joined in his entire opinion by Chief Justice
Burger andJustice Stewart. Justices Powell and Blackmun concurred in the result
and reasoning of Justice Rehnquist's overbreadth analysis.
147. The clarity of this distinction has not always been advanced. Summary
analysis and imprecise terminology have prevailed in cases where the unconstitu-
tionality was more patent. The two concepts have been blended together rather
than maintained as a bifurcated analysis. In Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940), for example, the Court stated that "[ilt is not merely the sporadic abuse of
power by the censor but the pervasive threat inherent in its very existence that
constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion." Id. at 97. Such language seems
to indicate that proof of a chilling effect is the final step; that such a finding
automatically will lead to a finding of unconstitutionality. Supporting the same
conclusion is NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), where the Court found that
"[t]he objectionable quality of... overbreadth... in the area of First Amend-
ment freedoms ... [depends on] a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and im-
proper application .... The threat of sanctions may deter... almost as potently
as the actual application of sanctions." Id. at 432-33 (citation omitted) (footnote
omitted).
In cases such as Thornhill and Button, where the statutes were in fact patently
overbroad, it is understandable how the two concepts, chilling effect and over-
breadth, could blend together. In closer cases, however, such imprecise analysis
causes confusion. Read narrowly, Arnett may do no more than insist on the
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regulation encroaches on protected speech, a court will proceed to ex-
amine it under the applicable first amendment analysis, be it the compel-
ling or substantial interest test. 148 Finally, in single-party challenge suits,
proof of a chilling effect is unnecessary to satisfy the requirement of stand-
ing. Nevertheless, the concept may have utility in convincing a court that
the regulation is in fact overbroad. Although it does not lead automatic-
ally to a finding of overbreadth, a chilling effect, as an evidentiary matter,
may be persuasive as to whether the regulation touches on constitutionally
protected speech.
The cumulative effect of Broadrick, Arnett, and the Lewis dissent
seemingly calls into question the remaining vitality of the overbreadth doc-
trine. 149 Recently, however, the Court in Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment150 reaffirmed the overbreadth doctrine,
holding that the court of appeals was correct in deciding that a village
ordinance that prohibited door-to-door or on-street solicitation of con-
tributions for charitable purposes was overbroad. 151 Moreover, Village of
Schaumburg, which was decided only four months prior to Central Hud-
son, implied that the overbreadth doctrine had application "in certain
commercial speech cases. 1 52
IV. THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC THEORIES ON BUSINESS
COMMUNICATIONS AND ITS EFFECTS ON FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION
The development of constitutional protection of economic speech,
from Pittsburgh Press through Ohralik, makes clear that conduct that is a
component of an illegality can be regulated, even though speech is impli-
cated. 15s Ohralik was expressive, particularly in dictum, that the exchange
of price and production information among competitors can be regulated
to a degree without offending first amendment interests.'1 4 The Ohralik
maintenance of the analytical distinction. Read more broadly, the case reflects
judicial willingness, previously expressed in Broadrick and the Lewis dissent, to
narrow the parameters of the overbreadth doctrine itself.
148. See notes 54 & 93 supra.
149. Although these trends may not be settled law, their apparent favor with
the present Court at least must warn the prospective litigant and counsel of the
scrutiny with which arguments based on overbreadth will be received. This would
seem true particularly in the context of business-motivated speech given the
Court's announced reluctance to apply the doctrine there. See notes 68-85 and
accompanying text supra. See generally Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 380-81
(1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
150. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
151. Id. at 634-35.
152. Id. at 638-39.
153. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
154. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
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Court did not elaborate on this theory, however, nor has the Court done so
specifically in the trade regulation context in subsequent cases. The four-
tiered standard articulated in Central Hudson is the only doctrinal at-
tempt and that, of course, was not within the antitrust or trade regulation
field. Nevertheless, it is, together with several earlier antitrust cases,
instructive on the constitutional limitations of antitrust orders.
A. Interseller Price Communications Under the Sherman Act
1. Early Developments
Even before the development of first amendment protection of pure
economic speech, the Supreme Court suggested in Sugar Institute, Inc. v.
United States155 that disclosure and exchange of price information were
lawful. In Sugar Institute, the Court condemned, as a violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act, an agreement that required adherence to price terms
which had been announced publicly by members of a sugar manufac-
turers' trade association. The Court approved, however, the advance an-
nouncement of price information. The order entered by the trial court in
Sugar Institute forbade the following conduct, although the trial court did
not hold the practice of price announcements to be illegal:
Effectuating any system for... reporting... among... com-
petitors or to a common agency, information as to current or
future prices, terms, conditions ... [r]elaying by or through The
Sugar Institute . . . information as to current or future prices,
terms, conditions . .. [g]iving any prior notice of any change or
155. 297 U.S. 553 (1936). Earlier Supreme Court decisions had ruled that the
exchange of price information among competitors would be analyzed under a
rule of reason standard. See Cement Mfrs.' Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268
U.S. 588 (1925); Maple Flooring Mfrs.' Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563
(1925); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923);
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). When
evidence existed that the purpose or effect of the agreement to exchange price
information was to restrict competition the agreement was found violative of § 1
of the Sherman Act. Id. But price and production data exchanges were approved
when the data disseminated was on closed transactions and the information was
available to all who had a commercial interest. Maple Flooring Mfrs.' Ass'n v.
United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
Initially, a first amendment defense was not recognized in these early price ex-
change cases. See American Column & Lumber Co., 257 U.S. at 412 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); id. at 416 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); G. LAMB & C. SHIELDS, TRADE
ASSOCIATION CASE AND PRACTICE 35-37 (1971). Later, however, it gained
recognition. See Maple Flooring Mfrs.'Ass'n, 268 U.S. at 583. But see Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 456. See generally D. O'BRIEN & D. SWANN,
INFORMATION AGREEMENTS, COMPETITION AND EFFICIENCY 117-20 (1969);
Stocking, The Rule of Reason, Workable Competition and the Legality of Trade
Association Activities, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1954).
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contemplated change in prices, terms, conditions... or relaying,
reporting or announcing any such change in advance thereof. 15 6
When the Supreme Court reviewed the portion of the decree enjoining
disclosure of price information, it eliminated this portion from the order.
The Court reasoned that the "mere open announcement of prices" was not
unlawful, although the agreement not to deviate from announced prices,
which had the effect of eliminating price concessions and reductions, was
found to be unlawful.
Sugar Institute's sanction of the public disclosure of price information
may be distinguishable on its facts and, therefore, not be susceptible to
broad interpretation. First, the particular prices and terms of those prices
were not fixed by agreement. Second, the Court pointed out carefully that
the price announcements could not be enjoined without careful considera-
tion of the institutional role they played in the practice of the particular
trade. The restraint on the announcements of current and future prices
was eliminated because it would prevent the traditional practice in the
industry of selling on "moves." A "move" was an announcement that, at a
particular time in the future, prices would be increased. Such announce-
ments were followed usually by a flurry of buying by sugar users who
wanted to stock up before the price increased. The practice of selling on
moves was necessitated by the fact that raw material costs amounted to
about eighty percent of total production costs. The price announcements
always reflected an increase in the price of raw sugar, a price over which
competitors had no control and that was not subject to manipulation to a
competitor's own advantage. Since an increase in raw material costs
affected all refiners equally, the announcements did not result in price
increases by competitors that would not have otherwise occurred. Selling
on moves, therefore, was found by the Court to be an inevitable, rational
practice in the industry and not necessarily anticompetitive. 157
Although Sugar Institute appears to provide authority that a decree
enjoining consciously parallel price leadership and price announcements
may not sweep so broadly as to prohibit public announcements of prices or
price changes, the decision arguably can be interpreted more narrowly. 5
The Court's allowance of the continuation of price announcements seems
to be based primarily on the fact that the announcements, coupled with
the increase in sales that always followed, constituted an elementary and
essential part of the sales process of the industry. In short, Sugar Institute
156. 297 U.S. at 603.
157. Id. at 584-85, 601-02.
158. More recently, in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643
(1980) (per curiam), the Court indicated that the distinction drawn in Sugar
Institute "between the lawful right to publish prices and terms of sale.., and an
agreement among competitors limiting action with respect to the published
prices" would dissolve if the publication of prices and terms of sale was a part of
an arrangement to fix prices. Id. at 649-50.
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teaches that before an order can enjoin the exchange of price information,
the court first must inquire how closely the disclosure is related to the
unlawful agreement to tamper with prices, and second, what role the price
announcement or exchange played in the trade practice,1 59 as distin-
guished from its role in the price-fixing conspiracy.
Under this interpretation of Sugar Institute, the result in Pittsburgh
Press was presaged. It also helps to explain the application of the illegal
conduct exception. If a price information communication between com-
petitors or the public is related to an agreement to fix prices, then Sugar
Institute would serve as no shield from regulation. Sugar Institute indi-
cates, however, that the relationship between the communication and the
price-fixing agreement must be more than merely incidental before the
price communication can be enjoined. Although Pittsburgh Press lacked
clarity on this point, its holding seems consistent with this interpretation.
The second prong of Sugar Institute may have been subconsciously the
impetus for the market structure analysis and economic theory that
achieved acceptance in United States v. Container Corp. of America. 160 In
determining the role that a price communication played within an agree-
ment to fix prices, Sugar Institute considered how the communication was
affected by market conditions and trade practice, while Container focused
on how the market structure was determinative of the legality of the com-
munication.
Container was the first explicit indication that the Supreme Court
would expand its analysis to consider market structure effects on price
exchanges. In Container, eighteen defendants accounted for ninety per-
cent of the corrugated container production in a particular geographical
region. The defendants agreed to exchange current price information on
request; no other conduct was challenged. 161 Although market entry was
easy, sellers numerous, and elasticity of demand low, the Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Douglas, found that the exchange violated the
Sherman Act. The Court relied largely on structural analysis, 162 rather
than evidence of culpable conduct.
In scrutinizing whether the exchange had an anticompetitive purpose
or effect, the Court relied on an economic structure theory which sug-
gested that in a market dominated by a few sellers, where the product is
homogeneous and fungible, and where competition centers on price, price
.159. Cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (Court exa-
mined market purpose of a blanket licensing agreement to determine whether it
was a per se illegal price-fixing arrangement). See CBS, Inc. v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d
930 (2d Cir. 1980) (court affirmed the original district court opinion that blanket
licenses did not restrain competition), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1491 (1981).
160. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
161. Id. at 335.
162. Id at 336-37.
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exchanges tend to stabilize prices.165 Based on this price theory, the Court
drew certain inferences. Because the corrugated container industry was
163. Id. at 337. The economic argument supporting price disclosure centers
on the idea that if there is more market information available to competitors,
there is a greater chance that allocative efficiency will be enhanced. Allocative
efficiency generally refers to maximization of consumer desires in light of limited
available seller resources. A competitive market in terms of allocative efficiency
will be characterized by prices being at or near production (including distribu-
tion) costs. Markets dominated by monopolies, on the other hand, will produce
low allocative efficiency since prices will be far above costs due to the failure to
maximize consumer preferences. When buyers and sellers have a wide variety of
market information available they will buy and sell at the lowest prices, thereby
promoting efficiency and competition in the market. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 268 (1977). In sum, the more informed competitors
are about the market conditions of supply and demand, the more likely the
market will be efficient. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
422, 441 n.16 (1978).
Economists believe that one of the variables affecting competition in the
market is the structure of the market. The perfectly or purely competitive market
(atomistic structure) is characterized by a large numbers of buyers and sellers, so
numerous that price decisions by any one competitor have no effect on the pricing
or output decisions of another. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 10 (2d ed. 1980). The perfect competition model,
in addition, assumes that the product sold is homogeneous and that buyers and
sellers have perfect market information about prices. Rarely, if ever, will such a
market exist. For example, products sold between competitors may not be
homogeneous, perfect price information may not be available, or market entry
may not be complete. Thus, where the competition is not perfect the market
forces, such as informational disclosures, will, in the absence of cartelization,
promote competition and lower prices as buyers will seek sellers with the lowest
prices. The result is that allocative efficiency will be promoted.
This economic theory that the vigor of competition is related positively to the
number of firms in the relevant industry must, however, be functionally related to
the concentration ratio in the market. Market concentration ratio is generally
defined "as the percentage of total industry sales ... contributed by the largest
few firms, ranked in the order of market share." Id. at 56. Few industries fit the
model of pure competition described above, and indeed the economic theory
applied in Container is one used to describe a model of competition in a concen-
trated market where there are few sellers.
A concentrated, oligopolistic market, in contrast to pure competition, is one
characterized as having a few sellers each of whom believes that its price decisions
will have a direct effect on the output and price decisions of its competitors. Id. at
11. This phenomenon is known as interdependence. It predicts that each seller
will take into account the pricing and output decisions of each competitor. See
Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962). Therefore, if one
competitor reduces prices with the result that sales are expanded, those sales will
come from sales of other competitors, and the result will be that the other com-
petitors, acting interdependently, will reduce promptly their prices accordingly.
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dominated by eighteen of fifty-one firms in a market with an inelastic de-
mand for products, the Court found the conclusion "irresistible that the
exchange of price information... had an anticompetitive effect in the
industry, chilling the vigor of price competition.
164
Knowing that this response will follow, the original seller will not reduce prices to
increase sales or market share because any gain will be nullified swiftly by the
retaliatory reactions of rival sellers. The actions of a seller in a concentrated
market will be determined then by the oligopolistic structure of the market,
which dictates interdependent pricing and output decisions. The result of this in-
terdependent pricing is that no seller in the oligopoly will push a price cut. "Each
firm recognizes the group's common interest in orderly pricing, and hence in
adherence to the accepted price structure." F. SCHERER, supra, at 152-53 (lst ed.
1970). As a consequence, price competition is avoided. See generally P. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 224-33 (2d ed. 1974); P. ASCH, ECONOMIC THEORY AND
THE ANTITRUST DILEMMA 50 (1970); J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION
112-23, 273-87, 315-20, 430-68 (1967); F. SCHERER, supra, at 131-40, 152-53 (1st
ed. 1970); L. SULLIVAN, supra, at 330-74; INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE
NEW LEARNING (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann &J. Weston eds. 1974); Bain, Rela-
tion of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration: American Manufacturing,
1936-40, 65 Q.J. ECON. 293 (1951); Markham, The Nature and Significance of
Price Leadership, 41 AM. ECON. REV. 891 (1951); Stigler, A Theory of Oligopo-
ly, 72J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964). But see H. DEMSETZ, THE MARKET CONCENTRA-
TION DOCTRINE 7 (1973); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 44-77 (1976); Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Sug-
gested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562 (1969).
One school of economists and lawyers argues that an exchange or disclosure of
price information among competitors in a highly concentrated market will in-
crease further the already present structural phenomenon of "interdependence,"
thereby facilitating anticompetitive performance through coordinated behavior.
L. SULLIVAN, supra, at 268, 270, 273. Container accepted this supposition and
inferred anticompetitive conduct from market structure. The analysis of market
structure was deemed critical to predicting anticompetitive market behavior. See
id. at 270-73. It was the first occasion where the Court applied an economic
theory to regulate price information disclosures. Justice Douglas observed that
while "[p]rice information exchanged in some markets may have no effect on a
truly competitive price .. . [t]he exchange of price data tends toward price
uniformity" in oligopolistic markets. 393 U.S. at 337.
In sum, the structure of an industry may indicate that it is predisposed toward
collusive stabilization of prices when there is price information exchange. The
more oligopolistic the market the more likely an exchange will encourage price
collusion. In a highly concentrated industry, where the few sellers are likely to
know or have access to the demand and supply information anyway, a prohibition
on disclosure of price information will not deter price competition significantly.
See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 198 (1981).
164. 393 U.S. at 337. Container has been criticized for, inter alia, its cursory
analysis of the conduct evidence and for its treatment of the structural evidence.
Specifically, Professor Lawrence Sullivan has commented that the conduct
evidence in Container fell "short of showing a violation," given the facts that there
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2. Toward a Structural Approach and Per Se Rule
The Container decision signaled a new turn in antitrust analysis. The
Court analyzed the legality of economic communications principally
under a market structure test rather than a conduct test. The analysis
focused on the structure of the market in determining the impact of the
conduct on competition. In short, the industry's structure became the
most relevant consideration in determining the legality of the defendants'
conduct. Although this structural approach predated by six years the ac-
ceptance of first amendment defenses in business speech, had the ap-
proach retained the full vitality expressed in Container, it would have been
a major force in delimiting the communications permitted in the antitrust
speech field.
If, under a structural analysis, disclosures of economic information are
inherently suspect and deemed unlawful in an industry defined as concen-
trated or oligopolistic, such communication per se would not be entitled to
first amendment protection. 1 65 Regardless of whether the communication
actually played a role in fixing prices, Container's logic that there is a
predisposition toward collusion in a concentrated market would be suffi-
cient to declare a mere exchange a restraint of trade. There would be no
need to scrutinize, under Sugar Institute, whether an agreement to fix
prices existed, the actual relationship the exchange played to any agree-
ment between the competitors, the impact it had on price changes in the
market, or the function it played in relation to trade practices in the indus-
try. The structure of the market would determine the legality of the
disclosure.1 66 From this analysis, it follows under Pittsburgh Press that
business disclosures may be entitled to little first amendment protection,
and broad injunctive orders could be drawn accordingly.
3. Less Structural Emphasis and the Adoption of Rule of Reason
Although ambiguous, Container suggested a per se rule: it is not
necessary to establish evidence of either unlawful purpose or anticom-
was "no agreement by the participants not to change a quotation after reporting
it," the exchanges were infrequent, and the data was available from records of the
defendants and customers. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 163, at 272. See 393 U.S. at
335-36. He also is critical of the structural evidence, characterizing it as
"borderline." This would include the following: (1) a moderate degree of concen-
tration, (2) cross-elasticity of demand among products, (3) ease of entry into the
market, and (4) over-capacity. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 163, at 272.
165. Commentators have disagreed on whether price information exchanges
should be regulated under an economic theory approach. Compare Maginness,
The Exchange of Price Information as a Restraint of Trade: Reassessing Per Se
Rules in Light of First Amendment Protection of Commercial Speech, 48 FORD.
HAM L. REV. 1005 (1980) with Note, Antitrust LiabilityforAn Exchange of Price
Information'- What Happened to Container Corporation?, 63 VA. L. REV. 639
(1977).
166. R. POSNER, supra note 163, at 143-47.
[Vol. 46
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petitive effect in order to find an antitrust violation for price information
exchanges in an oligopolistic market. The importance of this evidentiary
approach is obvious in terms of the scope of an order. If the central analysis
focuses on structure rather than culpable conduct, an order can be drawn
more broadly. The Court retreated from this position, however, in subse-
quent cases.
In United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 6 7 the Court
stated unequivocally that the disclosure of price information is not a per se
violation of the Sherman Act. 68 Interestingly, Citizens & Southern did not
cite for this proposition the majority opinion in Container, but rather the
concurring opinion of Justice Fortas. With regard to the standard of legal-
ity for price information disclosures, Justice Fortas made clear that the
dissemination and exchange of price information by sellers was not a per se
violation, but required actual proof "that the practice resulted in an
unreasonable restraint of trade."' 69 The dissent in Container was equally
persistent on the evidentiary burden required under a structural analysis.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, concluded that
[g]iven the uncertainty about the probable effect of an exchange
of price information. . . [in a market that does not have all the
characteristics of a true oligopoly], I would require that the
Government prove that the exchange was entered into for the pur-
pose of, or that it had the effect of, restraining price
competition.1
70
More recently, in United States v. United States Gypsum Co. , a
167. 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
168. Id. at 113. The defendant was charged with an illegal acquistion under
§ 7 of the Clayton Act and with a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act for an
exchange of credit information. Georgia state banking laws proscribed branch
banking, but permitted banks to own up to five percent of the stock of other
banks beyond the city limits where the main bank was located. Defendant ac-
quired five percent ownership of six suburban banks through the "five percent"
state banking law. Georgia thereafter amended its law permitting de jure branch
banking countywide. The defendant then sought acquisition of all of the stock of
the six banks. After the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation authorized all but
one of the purchases, the Department of Justice sued.
169. 393 U.S. at 339 (Fortas, J., concurring).
170. Id. at 343 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
171. 438 U.S. 422 (1978). The defendants in Gypsum, several manufacturers
of gypsum board, were charged criminally with price fixing under § 1 of the Sher-
man Act. The defendants raised § 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §
13(b) (1976), as a defense to the Sherman indictment, arguing that in order to.
prevent consumer fraud concerning price, it was necessary to engage in interseller
price verification. The Court rejected this argument, holding that § 2(b) does not
necessarily contemplate actual price verification between competitors. 438 U.S.
at 453. But see Cement Mfrs.' Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588
(1925) (Sherman Act exemptions for price verification plan in response to
customers' practices of fraud). See also Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC 440
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criminal case, the issue confronting the Court was whether an interseller
price verification plan among competitors, for the purpose of defending a
Robinson-Patman price discrimination charge, was exempt from the
Sherman Act's coverage. The Court held that the exchange of business
information among competitors does "not constitute a per se violation of
the Sherman Act. '1 72 Directing its reasoning to the structural analysis of
Container, the Court noted that "[t]he exchange of price data and other
information among competitors does not invariably have anticompetitive
effects; indeed such practices can in certain circumstances increase
economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, com-
petitive." 178
Factors that can be considered in determining the legality of the inter-
seller communication, according to Gypsum, are, inter alia, the structure
of the industry and the nature of the information exchanged.1 74 In con-
trast to Container, these evidentiary concerns are not used to condemn the
commercial communication as per se illegal; rather, they can be evaluated
only in the context of whether the challenged conduct had an anticompeti-
tive purpose or effect-the standard rule of reason analysis. Thus, Gypsum
reaffirmed that interseller price communications should be regulated only
on a rule of reason basis. It signaled also that the Court had less penchant
for a strict Container-like structural approach in evaluating business infor-
mation disclosures.
In contrast to Container, Gypsum permits a more reasoned approach
by the courts in analyzing the character of business data disclosures. It
recognizes that in some industries disclosure of economic information
directed at competitors and customers can have competitive effects. It
cautions, in addition, that a per se structural approach would inhibit
societal benefits that could be derived from such disclosure. Such benefits
can be achieved when the communication makes competitors and custom-
ers more aware of market price, demand, and supply information. 17r The
availability of market information can also reduce barriers to entry. Infor-
mation exchanges, thus, can lead to greater competition through more
direct competition on price and more efficient allocation of resources.
U.S. 69 (1979); Galanti, It Once Again Takes Two To Tango: Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 387 (1979).
172. 438 U.S. at 441 n.16. See also id. at 436 n.13.
173. Id. at 441 n.16.
174. The Court pointed out that, although not unlawful per se, current price
information disclosures have been held anticompetitive, and thus unlawful. Id.
See note 155 supra. See also Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. at 80
(Court took account of oligopolistic market structure in Robinson-Patman Act
case to determine competitive effect if buyer were required to disclose to seller a
competitor's bid price).
175. Maple Flooring Mfrs.' Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582-83
(1925); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 412-13
(1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
560 [Vol. 46
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Therefore, under Gypsum and Sugar Institute, industry structure may
help predict the effect that certain conduct will have in a market, but it
ought not preclude evidence establishing that the disclosure was not part
of an agreement to fix prices or that, in fact, there existed no agreement to
fix prices, or that the disclosure had a competitive effect on the market.
When conduct evidence is available to analyze the character of the
business disclosure or market reaction to the disclosure, this evidence
should be preferred as a predictor of anticompetitive significance rather
than utilization of a structural model under an a prori approach. If a
commercial speech defense is raised, this suggested approach is liberal
enough to permit evidence regarding the relative relationship that the
communication had to an agreement to fix prices and the role it played in
the trade practice. Of course, if conduct evidence establishes that the com-
munication is a part of or bears a close relationship to concerted action
among competitors to tamper with the price structure, 7 6 or that the con-
duct had a necessary tendency to restrain competition, it would be without
first amendment protection. 177
4. Current Enforcement Approaches
Recent trends in the enforcement of the antitrust laws indicate an
emerging tension between the enforcement approaches of the Justice
Department and the FTC and first amendment interests. Both agencies
have indicated in the last several years that they will pursue, in addition to
structural relief,1 78 broad behavioral remedies or conduct orders against
alleged antitrust violators. The target of the enforcement efforts has been
oligopoly pricing. The design and effect of behaviorally oriented orders
are to reduce business communications and market information dissemi-
nated between competitors. The enforcement threory is directed as pro-
hibiting price announcements or the discussion, in public, of price
changes by competitors. Specifically, the new enforcement effort centers
on routing out parallel conduct by firms in an oligopolistic market. 1 79 Two
recent cases illustrate the point.
176. E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221
(1940).
177. See FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 454 (1922).
178. E.g., In re Exxon Corp., No. 8934 (F.T.C. July 17, 1973) (complaint);
In re Kellogg Co., No. 8883 (F.T.C. April 26, 1972) (complaint).
179. The problem of parallel conduct by competitors in a concentrated in-
dustry has plagued antitrust enforcement efforts. Although parallel conduct
might be considered anticompetitive if pricing patterns among competitors can
be shown, establishing an antitrust violation has proven elusive without evidence
of an agreement or tacit collusion. The enforcement argument is based on the
economic pricing theory of interdependence: sellers in an oligopoly recognize
that their own price and production decisions are dictated, given the industry
structure, in large part by what the reactions of other sellers will be to price
1981]
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moves. Anticipating those reactions, competitors adopt parallel pricing. See note
163 supra.
The government has challenged pricing in oligopolistic industry patterns by
alleging that "conscious parallelism" is the functional equivalent of an agree-
ment, and thus is proscribed under the Sherman Act. That theory, however, was
rejected by the Court in Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib.
Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954). See A. NEALE & D. GOYDER, THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 84-85 (3d ed. 1980).
In Theatre Enterprises, the Court erased doubts created by the meaning of its
earlier decision in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
Interstate Circuit held that parallel action by competitors (identical modifica-
tions in licensing contracts) was sufficient circumstantial evidence to sustain a
jury finding of conspiracy to fix prices, in the absence of direct evidence of an
agreement. Id. at 226-27. See also United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265,
275 (1942); C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 494 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952). The Interstate Circuit Court went on to
declare, in dictum, that "[i]t was enough that, knowing that concerted action was
contemplated and invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme
and participated in it... ." 306 U.S. at 226. This was interpreted to mean that no
agreement need be shown in order to establish a violation. See American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC,
168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), affd by an equally divided Court per curiam sub
nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949).
Theatre Enterprises, however, precluded an expansive reading of Interstate
Circuit by holding that evidence of interdependent consciously parallel action,
standing alone, is not sufficient to support a finding of an illegal agreement under
the Sherman Act. 346 U.S. at 540-41. Subsequent cases indicate that the agree-
ment requirement can be met if there is evidence of consciously parallel conduct
plus so-called "plus factors" (evidence that a defendant's conduct is not in its indi-
vidual best interest). See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253
(1968); Naumkeag Theatres Co. v. New England Theatres, Inc., 345 F.2d 910,
911-12 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 906 (1965); Michelman v. Clark-
Schwebel Fiber Glass Corp., 534 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885
(1976); Venzie Corp. v. United States Mineral Prods. Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1314
(3d Cir. 1975); Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir.
1963); Golf City, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 555 F.2d 426 (5th Cir.
1977); Hallmark Indus. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 489 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); Independent Iron Works, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp., 322 F.2d 656 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963); American Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Delta Communications Corp., 408 F. Supp. 1075, 1088-92 (S.D.
Miss. 1976), affd, 579 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. National
Malleable & Steel Castings Co., [1957] Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,580 (N.D. Ohio
1957), affd per curiam, 358 U.S. 38 (1958). But see Norfolk Monument Co. v.
Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 394 U.S. 700 (1969); United States v. GM
Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Mages v. Spalding Sales Corp., [1975]
2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,538 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Wall Prods. Co. v. National Gyp-
sum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971). See generally R. BORK, THE ANTI-
TRUST PARADOX 178-97 (1978); 1 M. HANDLER, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ANTI-
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In 1976 the Department of Justice, General Electric, and Westing-
house Electric filed joint motions to modify a consent decree entered in
1962.1 80 The original consent decree between the parties arose out of a civil
action brought by the government alleging a price-fixing agreement on
large turbine generators. The government suit charged that the defen-
dants agreed on price adjustments on certain turbine generators and, in
general, coordinated price increases. The consent decree enjoined the
defendants from, among other things, communicating "pricing informa-
tion to one another until after the information had been released"'81 in the
trade. The decree, however, did permit publication of price books and
public exchange of competitive information.
The government sought to modify the consent decree in 1976 based on
an investigation begun in 1962 which revealed that there had been an
elimination of price competition by the "conscious adoption and publica-
tion of identical pricing."'8 2 The post-1962 scheme allegedly utilized a
pricing book detailing prices regarding all aspects of the complex
machinery in question, formulas for computing prices, and examples of
how the formulas were to be used. The price books allegedly enabled each
defendant to predict the price and type of machine on which each com-
petitor would bid. 8 3 A price protection plan also was utilized. It was
coupled with a public announcement of all outstanding orders and prices.
If the price paid by any customer was discounted, all buyers in the previous
six months would receive retroactively-the same discount. The government
concluded that the price book, with its published multiplier, and the pro-
tection plan resulted in identical pricing in the turbine generator industry.
Through the use of internal documents, the government hoped to estab-
lish that the price-fixing result was intentional. Rather than face another
civil suit, the defendants agreed to join in the modification of the 1962
order.
In general, the consent decree prohibited the defendants from engag-
ing in a broad range of communications relevant to pricing. It prohibited
the publication or distribution of so-called price-signaling information. 8 4
TRUST 531 (1973); 2 id. at 793; C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY
106-09 (1959); Nye, Can Conduct Oriented Enforcement Inhibit Conscious
Parallelism?, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 206, 222 (1975); Posner, supra note 163;
Turner, supra note 163.
180. United States v. GE Co., [1977] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72,715 (E.D. Pa.
1977); 42 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (1977).
181. 42 Fed. Reg. 17,005 (1977). At the same time the civil suits were filed,
the Department, in 1960, filed an indictment against the defendants. The cor-
porate defendants pleaded guilty and the individual defendants entered pleas of
nolo contendere.
182. [1977] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 72,716.
183. Id.
184. The price signaling theory was first advanced by the Justice Department
in United States v. GM Corp., [1974] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 97,656 (E.D. Mich.
1981] 563
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The defendants were enjoined from disclosing to any nonemployee its
price lists, price changes, quotations, bids, or pricing policies for turbine
generators. 85 The order, in essence, was designed to prohibit (1) the
signaling or communication of an invitation from one competitor to
another on eliminating elements of competition; (2) certain conduct that
acted as an enforcement device on the agreed-on prices; and (3) dissemin-
ation of price-related commercial data from which competitors could
track each other's pricing policies. 86
1974). The court in GM held that the government failed to prove that price an-
nouncements were invitations or signals to competitors to fix prices. The court
concluded, "Neither a pricing move by a competitor, nor a requested pricing
change by a customer, can be regarded as an invitation to conspire which
precludes a business from acting in its best economic interest by changing its
prices when desirable.... The public announcement of a pricing decision cannot
be twisted into an invitation or signal to conspire; it is instead an economic reality
to which all other competitors must react." Id. at 97,671. See also Universal Lite
Distribs., Inc. v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 452 F. Supp. 1206, 1217 (D. Md. 1978),
affd as to this issue, 602 F.2d 1173 (4th Cir. 1979).
185. The critical requirements of the modification were as follows: (1)
development of new price lists after the modified order became effective; (2)
refraining from pricing procedures involving the use of the multiplier factor; (3)
refraining from revealing new price lists to nonemployees of the defendants; (4)
refraining from revealing information concerning bargaining, performance
guarantees, pricing formulas, price changes, spare part prices, and performance
specifications; and (5) strictly controlling possession of the new price books, with
warnings attached that unauthorized possession could lead to penalties. [1977] 2
Trade Cas. (CCH) at 72,719.
186. See generally P. AREEDA, supra note 163, at 229-30. The defendants in
GE denied the theory of the government's case. Conceding that equal price levels
existed between the two competitors, they argued that this result was due to either
price leadership by GE or conscious parallelism between the two competitors.
While admitting interdependent pricing, the defendants argued that the duopoly
structure of the industry dictated that each consider the other's pricing decisions
in order to compete. The government maintained, however, that from the de-
fendants' conduct ("public exchange of assurances"), the requisite "agreement"
element of a § 1 Sherman Act violation could be inferred. Central to the govern-
ment's burden of establishing an agreement between the parties was its theory
that the one manufacturer would, through public announcements, communicate
a signal or invitation to the other to follow its lead in pricing. When a similar
price move followed, according to the theory, the invitation had been accepted.
Through internal documents of Westinghouse, the government represented that
it could establish Westinghouse "perceived the GE actions as an invitation to
stabilize prices." The government was prepared to show evidence of an agreement
through a pattern of conduct by demonstrating that Westinghouse adopted GE's
price increases, published a price book similar to GE's, adopted the multiplier
system, announced customer orders, and adopted a price protection plan like
GE's. 42 Fed. Reg. 17,006-07 (1977).
48
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss3/2
FIRST AMENDMENT AND ANTITRUST
The conduct-oriented modified decree in GE/Westinghouse, which
attempted to fence in and proscribe all forms of price signaling that
resulted in a pattern of equal pricing, was heralded as the government's
new theory in attacking parallel conduct. 87 The government was pre-
pared to argue that its new "signaling" theory went beyond mere conscious
parallelism and that, from the evidence, a conspiracy to restrain trade
could be inferred. 88 The constitutional scope of the order, however,
escaped review because the defendants chose not to challenge its breadth.
The GE/Westinghouse decree is illustrative of the type of trade regula-
tion order that requires vigorous scrutiny under the first amendment. To
be sure, the order was broad. But arguably, it stayed fairly close to the
approximate scope of the defendants' prior alleged unlawful conduct. If
the defendants' business communications facilitated, or otherwise were
implicated closely in an unlawful price-fixing scheme, then clearly under
Pittsburgh Press the speech could be prohibited. Only if the speech was
incidental to, rather than a part of, the price-fixing arrangement might it
escape less rigorous regulation. Similarly, if the order exceeded the per-
missible bounds of regulation because it was more extensive than necessary
to serve the governmental interests in the enforcement of the antitrust
laws, then the order's scope may be curtailed under Central Hudson. It is
difficult, however, under the facts of GE/Westinghouse to characterize
the order as overbroad. 8 9 While the restrained speech was purely com-
mercial, its close relation to an antitrust consequence allegedly
demonstrated that it served as a facilitating device in bringing about a
tacit agreement. The defendants might have challenged this order suc-
cessfully, if they had been able to establish that their price books,
multipliers, public announcements, and disclosures of other price-related
information were not designed to and did not contribute to the scheme to
fix prices.
The FTC also advanced recently the price signaling theory in an action
under section 5 of the FTC Act charging unfair methods of competition in
a complaint against manufacturers of gasoline "antiknock" additives. In
In re Ethyl Corp., 190 the FTC seeks to test the constitutional sweep of a pro-
posed conduct-oriented order which is designed to prohibit price signal-
187. 42 Fed. Reg. 17,007 (1977).
188. Id. at 17,004.
189. From a Central Hudson overbreadth standpoint, the weakest link in the
order was the proscription found in § 2(f)(ii)-(iii), (g) against disclosure of perfor-
mance guarantee information and specifications of the large turbine generators.
Arguably these restraints, particularly on disclosure of the specifications, were, at
best, only tenuously related to price and hence to any the price-fixing scheme. See
generally Posner, Information and Antitrust: Reflections on the Gypsum and
Engineers Decisions, 67 GEO. L.J. 1187, 1201 (1979).
190. No. 9128 (F.T.C., filed May 30, 1979) (complaint), noted at [1976-1979
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,579.
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ing, together with other facilitating practices. Apparently, the Commis-
sion staff will attempt to establish its charge of unfairness in the absence of
evidence of a conspiracy, agreement, or improper intent. The case, like
GE/Westinghouse, is directed at oligopoly parallel pricing.
The complaint alleges that the four respondents, who had a total
market share of eighty percent, maintained uniform prices for antiknock
compounds by "signaling" future price changes to competitors. 19' Each
manufacturer allegedly accomplished this by (1) utilizing a thirty-day
price change advance notice clause in all sales contracts, (2) frequently
disclosing advance price changes, (3) selling only on a uniform delivered
price basis, and (4) dealing on a most-favored customer arrangement
whereby a customer is entitled to the lowest price at which the manufac-
turer sells to other buyers. 92 The pivotal theory is that price signaling,
facilitated by advance price change announcements in the press, fore-
warned competitors of price changes, thus enabling coordination of prices
throughout the industry. By precluding selling through any means other
than an established delivered pricing system, no price distinction was
made for actual delivery costs among buyers. 93 Finally, the FTC argues
that most-favored customer clauses create a disincentive for price reduc-
tion.
The proposed conduct-based order is similar to the consent decree
entered in GE/Westinghouse. It, too, would challenge directly any first
amendment protection for public dissemination or communication of
price information. The order would prohibit the publication, distribu-
tion, or communication to any person (except an employee) of any current
or future price information, "except to convey to a customer or potential
customer the current price of specific antiknock compound.' 94 It would,
in addition, proscribe the disclosure of any price change prior to the effec-
tive date, or any price book or list, including information concerning
transportation charges. The order further would prohibit other alleged
facilitating practices such as refusing tosell-on a price system other than on
191. Id. Apparently, the Commission has economic evidence that the anti-
knock compound market was plagued for a three-year period by decrease in de-
mand and excess-capacity, while at the same time the sellers increased prices 18
times on anifidustry-wide basis, at the same time and in the same amount,
without-granting any discounts. The Commission staff argues that these market
conditions should have dictated lower, not higher, prices and that the price
increases exceeded the rate of inflation. 917 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) A-33 to -35 (June 7, 1979).
192. 917 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-33 to -35 (June 7, 1979).
193. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Triangle Conduit
& Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), affd by an equally divided
Court per curiam sub noma. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FrC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949). See
generally G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 147-64 (1968).
194. In re Ethyl Corp., No. 9128 (F.T.C., filed May 30, 1979) (complaint).
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the established delivered price system, and the most-favored customer
clause.
The proposed order is designed to reduce the amount of commercial
information available to competitors -a result at odds with post-Bigelow
commercial speech cases. Since the theory of the case is that the practices
have had the effect of reducing uncertainty about a competitor's prices,
thus facilitating reduction of price competition, the purpose behind the
order rests on an economic theory: by delaying the ability of competitors to
match price increases, uncertainty about price movements is created, with
the result that price uniformity and stability will be inhibited.1 95
The Ethyl order is problematic in several respects. First, like the
GE/Westinghouse decree, its proscription against communicating current
or future prices to the public is broad. Under the order the manufacturers
could not disclose future prices to anyone, other than an employee, or
disclose current prices to customers generally. Press releases containing
price changes would be prohibited as would other communications means.
In addition, communications with other parties that may have a need to
know would be prohibited. Only in response to a request fron an individ-
ual customer to bid or to engage in negotiations could a manufacturer
convey information relating to future prices. Moreover, the ban on com-
munications is without time limitations. Arguably, this order might chill
competitive vigor in the solicitation of customers, leading to less competi-
tion among the sellers. It also will lead to less competitive price informa-
tion available to customers. Furthermore, a decrease in market informa-
tion may result in increased barriers to entry for new competition. Each of
these results is at odds with the fundamental policy behind the antitrust
laws. If the challenged practices are found anticompetitive, however, the
order, under Pittsburgh Press, can be drawn to dismantle those practices
and to curb their consequences. For example, if the market practices
utilized by competitors facilitated price verification and stabilization, then
the practices and their consequences can be constitutionally restrained.
The first amendment limitations on the order, as discussed herein, cannot
be defined specifically until the impact of the challenged conduct and its
consequence is determined.
Moreover, the order goes beyond the earlier price signaling theory in
GE/Westinghouse. In Ethyl, the FTC essentially seeks to challenge non-
collusive, nonexclusionary conduct. The complaint does not charge an
agreement or conspiracy to inflate prices artificially. Because noncollusive
parallel conduct allegedly achieves a result similar to that of a traditional
agreement, it is challenged as unfair under section 5.196 GE!Westing-
195. 917 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-33 to -35 (June 7, 1979).
196. See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 721 n.19 (1948); FTC v. Beech-
Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 455 (1922); Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v.
FTC, 168 F.2d 175, 180-81 (7th Cir. 1948), affd by an equally divided Court per
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house, on the other hand, was commenced on the theory that there was a
conspiracy between the defendants to fix prices. The Justice Department
asserted that from the facts an inference of agreement could be made. To
establish the inference, the government was prepared to argue that internal
documents of the defendants would demonstrate that GE, through public
signals, was inviting Westinghouse to accept its offer to stablize prices, and
that Westinghouse perceived GE's actions as invitations to join. Each de-
fendant in its own way, then, allegedly was exchanging public assurances
that prices would not be cut. 197
Hence, the underlying rationale for GE/Westinghouse and Ethyl is
dissimilar. The former was based on specific evidence from which an in-
ference of an illegal conspiracy could have been drawn in establishing an
antitrust violation. The latter, however, rests not on an unlawful antitrust
agreement, but on an unfairness concept based on the mere unilateral
adoption of commercial practices, which allegedly enhances mutual con-
fidence in industry-wide prices, regardless of collusion or consciousness of
a competitor's practice. In other words, the Commission staff will attempt
to establish that certain business practices, when employed unilaterally
and commonly by oligopoly firms, have the effect of reducing the uncer-
tainty about pricing decisions of competitors and, hence, are "unfair"
under section 5.
Although there is some authority in the early decisional law supporting
the position that interdependent parallel pricing, even though noncollu-
sive, will support an unfairness charge under section 5, these cases are
equivocal on the issues raised in Ethyl. 98 For instance, in FTC v. Cement
curiam sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949); Boise
Cascade Corp., 91 F.T.C. 1, 23-34 (1978), enforcement denied, [1980] 2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 75,662 (9th Cir. 1980). Cf. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States,
306 U.S. 208 (1939) (§5 of FTC Act may be violated without express agreement).
But cf. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S.
537, 541 (1954) (Court noted that conscious parallelism alone does not establish a
Sherman Act conspiracy). See Turner, supra note 163; note 179 supra. See
generally Statement of FTC, Notice of the Staff: In re Commission Policy Toward
Geographic Pricing Practices (Oct. 12, 1948).
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held "that
in the absence of evidence of overt agreement to utilize a pricing system to avoid
price competition, the Commission must demonstrate that the challenged pricing
system has actually had the effect of fixing or stabilizing prices. Without such ef-
fect, a mere showing of parallel action will not establish a section 5 violation."
Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, [1980] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,662, 75,665 (9th Cir.
1980) (emphasis added).
197. 42 Fed. Reg. 17,006-07 (1977).
198. See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 721 n.19 (1948); FTC v. Beech-
Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 455 (1922); Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v.
FTC, 168 F.2d 175, 180-81 (7th Cir. 1948), affd by an equally divided Court per
curiam sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949). But see Boise
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Institute99 and Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC,200 the two prin-
cipal cases which presented delivered pricing systems similar to that in
Ethyl,201 the cases did imply in dictum that an agreement or conspiracy is
not a necessary ingredient to a section 5 charge, 20 2 as long as there is
evidence that the conduct has a "dangerous tendency unduly to hinder
competition. '" 203 In both Cement Institute and Triangle Conduit,
however, the courts explicitly found an agreement or collusion by the com-
petitors, 20 4 neither of which is charged in Ethyl. Moreover, the Supreme
Cascade Corp. v. FTC, [1980] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,662, 75,665 (9th Cir.
1980); Crouse-Hinds Co., 46 F.T.C. 1114 (1950).
Recently, an FTC Administrative LawJudge rejected an invitation by the FTC
staff to abandon the rule, announced in United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S.
300 (1919), that it is not a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act for a manufacturer
to announce unilaterally a pricing policy change with the caveat that the
manufacturer will refuse to deal with the retailer should the product be sold
below the designated price. In In re Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 1008 ANTI-
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) F-1 (F.T.C. March 16, 1981), the Administra-
tive LawJudge rejected the theory that the announcement of a price change and
subsequent acceptance by a dealer-customer constituted a vertical agreement to
fix prices. Judge Needelman concluded that from a price "invitation and accep-
tance" theory, one cannot infer an agreement, even a tacit agreement in a vertical
relationship between a supplier and customer, in the absence of evidence of coer-
cion. Moreover, the "mere announcement of pricing policy followed by com-
pliance does not constitute a coerced agreement." Id. at F-5.
The decision indicates, however, that the so-called Colgate doctrine, f6llowed
in this case, does not shield a defendant from the price signaling, "invitation and
acceptance" theory if a horizontal (between competitors, e.g., GE and Westing-
house) pricing arrangement is established. Furthermore, the decision does not
stand for the proposition that an agreement must be proven to exist under § 5.
The complaint and briefs of complaint counsel were clear that the FTC was not
proceeding under the § 5 "unfairness" jurisdiction. Rather, the staff argued that
respondent's pricing policy amounted to a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Act. Complaint counsel's brief noted:
The complaint makes no charge that, in the alternative Russell Stover's
conduct is an unfair method of competition in violation of § 5 indepen-
dent of the Sherman Act. If this court finds that Russell Stover's conduct
does not meet the Sherman Act's requisite elements, it should not find a
violation based on the more lenient § 5 standards.
Brief for Complainant, In re Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 1008 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) F-1 (F.T.C. March 16, 1981), quoted in id. at F-6.
199. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
200. 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), affd by an equally divided Court per
curiam sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949).
201. 333 U.S. at 721 n.19; 168 F.2d at 180-81.
202. 333 U.S. at 721 n.19; 168 F.2d at 180-81.
203. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. at 454. But see Boise Cascade
Corp. v. FTC, [1980] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,662, 75,665 (9th Cir. 1980).
204. 333 U.S. at 708-09; 168 F.2d at 180. In count two of Triangle Conduit,
the FTC charged conscious parallelism, apart from an agreement, on the theory
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Court has not addressed the issue for thirty-two years since its equally
divided opinion in Triangle Conduit affirmed the lower court decision,
and recent developments in the lower federal courts indicate that parallel
pricing patterns will not establish a section 5 violation in the absence of an
agreement, unless the challenged pricing conduct "actually had the effect
of fixing or stabilizing prices." 205
Furthermore, the Court has not chosen to accept a case where the issue
squarely presented has been whether, under first amendment standards,
an order under section 5 can proscribe dissemination of commercial infor-
mation where the evidence indicates interdependent pricing in an
oligopolistic market, but where there is no collusion or agreement to affect
prices or to violate the antitrust laws. Thus, at least three critical issues re-
main unresolved. First, the courts must decide whether parallel pricing
violates section 5 in the absence of an anticompetitive intent or an illegal
agreement. 20 6 Second, it is far from clear what impact Pittsburgh Press' il-
legal conduct exception to first amendment protection of commercial
that individual competitors utilized a delivered pricing system with knowledge of
the fact that other competitors did as well. Count one of the complaint alleged a
conspiracy. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found
that a conspiracy had been established under count one and went on to hold that
individual conduct, as charged under count two, which does not satisfy the agree-
ment required of the Sherman Act nevertheless may be an unfair method of com-
petition under § 5. Commentators have urged that Triangle Conduit's influence
as precedent for an independent violation under § 5 for consciously parallel ac-
tion is suspect because "a conspiracy had been properly established . . .
and the second charge was essentially directed to preventing its revival." A.
NEALE & D. GOYDER, supra note 179, at 88. Apparently, before the Boise
Cascade and Ethyl cases, the FTC decided that it would prosecute under § 5 only
if there was evidence of conspiracy. See- Interim Report on the Study of the
Federal Trade Commission Pricing Policies, S. DOC. No. 27, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
62-63 (1949), cited in Boise Cascade v. FTC, [1980] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,662,
75,665 (9th Cir. 1980). Accord, Crouse-Hinds Co., 46 F.T.C. 1114 (1950).
205. Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, [1980] 2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 75,662, 75,665
(9th Cir. 1980). Thus, the Commission, in Ethyl, will have to establish an actual
anticompetitive price effect or the existence of an agreement.
206. This is not to suggest that there are no legal theories which arguably sup-
port a challenge to oligopoly parallel pricing under § 1 of the Sherman Act or § 5
of the FTC Act. Evidence of voluntary interdependent pricing behavior by firms
in a concentrated industry might permit an inference that there was a meeting of
the minds by the competitors so as to warrant a conclusion that there was a tacit
agreement. This could be established by evidence similar to that urged in
GE/Westinghouse. See Posner, supra note 163. As the Court in Interstate Circuit
observed when discussing consciously parallel conduct: "It was enough that,
knowing that concerted action was contemplated and invited, the distributors
gave their adherence to the scheme and participated in it." Interstate Circuit, 306
U.S. at 226. But cf. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp.,
346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954) (conscious parallelism alone not Sherman Act
violation). The concept of interdependence as it relates to oligopoly behavior
[Vol. 46
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speech will have on the regulation of nonconcerted parallel pricing under
section 5. Finally, it is unclear what restraining role the fourth prong of
Central Hudson might play on the scope of an order, should the courts
decide to bring nonconcerted parallel pricing within the ambit of section5.
B. A Suggested Approach
The Court has not yet settled on the analytical boundaries it will follow
in addressing the kind of evidence, structural or conduct, that will support
a sweeping antitrust order that inhibits first amendment business com-
munications such as the exchange or disclosure of price information.
Nevertheless, its recent antitrust decision in National Society of Profes-
sional Engineers v. United States,207 read together with Central Hudson,
indicates that regulatory agencies can seek broad antitrust orders so long
as the order complies with the "narrowly drawn" requirement of Central
Hudson. The defendants in Professional Engineers challenged, on first
amendment grounds, an injunction entered by the district court which
had found that the defendants' canon of ethics violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act because it had the effect of restraining competition among
engineers. The injunction enjoined the trade association "from adopting
any official opinion, policy statement, or guideline stating or implying that
competitive bidding is unethical." 208 The injunction, in addition, ordered
the association to state affirmatively that "it did not consider competitive
bidding to be unethical." 20 9
The Court had little problem in resolving the challenge to the first part
of the order. It explicitly sanctioned broad governmental power to fashion
appropriate restraints on future activities, notwithstanding first amend-
ment defenses. In this regard it noted that trial judges can take into ac-
count the fact that an order "may impinge upon rights that would other-
then takes on a meaning closer to concerted conduct than to mere independent
response by competitors to the same set of market facts, in that, given the concen-
tration and structure of the market, each competitor before acting will consider a
rival's reaction and act accordingly. If each competitor is aware that each firm
will act similarly, then the reaction to each other's moves would seem to be
understood implicitly. This definition arguably would fall within National Lead's
"planned common course of action" definition in describing concerted action.
FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957).
207. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). In ProfessionalEngineers, the government brought
a civil antitrust action against a professional trade association, alleging that its
rules of ethics were in violation of the antitrust laws because they prevented
member engineers from engaging in competitive bidding until an engineer had
been selected for a project. The Supreme Court, applying a rule of reason
analysis, affirmed the district court's finding that the canon of ethics violated § 1
of the Sherman Act.
208. Id. at 697 (footnote omitted).
209. Id. at 686 n.8.
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wise be constitutionally protected," 210 but stated that such rights will not
prevent the issuance of a broad order to remedy the illegal conduct. As
long as the "relief represents a reasonable method of eliminating the conse-
quences of the illegal conduct,"21' it will be upheld even though it goes
beyond the precise conduct found violative of the law. Should the defend-
ant believe that the order as applied will interfere with legitimate com-
munications or expressions, the remedy is to petition a court for relief or
modification of the original order. 212
Viewed broadly, Professional Engineers seems to negate, at least by
implication, first amendment defenses in the adoption of orders
regulating antitrust conduct. Viewed in the context of the more recent
Central Hudson and the lower court opinion in Professional Engineers,
however, the opinion should not be interpreted so literally. 213 Central
Hudson, which was decided two years after Professional Engineers, failed
to cite Professional Engineers when it struck down an overbroad order as
more extensive than necessary and, thus, offensive to the first amendment.
Arguably this dichotomy may be reconcilable because CentralHudson did
not involve violations of the antitrust laws, while Professional Engineers
did. Perhaps the Court is suggesting that a broader order is constitutionally
permissible when the injunctive order seeks to remedy and fence in illegal
conduct and its consequences, of which the communication is a part. The
force of such an interpretation, however, is undercut by the action of the
court of appeals in Professional Engineers.
Addressing the second part of the district court's injunction, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the
first amendment would not permit an order requiring the association to
state affirmatively "that it does not consider competitive bidding to be
unethical." 214 The court reasoned that such an order would "be more
intrusive than necessary to achieve fulfillment of the governmental in-
terest." 2151 This, of course, is the exact standard applied in Central Hud-
210. Id. at 697-98.
211. Id. at 698. See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo Group, Ltd., 410 U.S. 52,
64 (1973); International Salt Co. v.-United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400-01 (1947).
Chief Justice Burger dissented from this part of the Professional Engineers opi-
nion. He believed that the first amendment protected the right of the association
to state publicly that the competitive bidding practice, in its opinion, was
unethical. Id. at 701 (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
212. See also FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360, 367-68 (1962)
(enforcement proceedings are the proper place to litigate the breadth of an
order). A narrower order was rejected because "[u]pon any future enforcement
proceeding, the Commission and the Court of Appeals will have ready at hand
interpretive tools ... for use in tailoring the order, in the setting of a specific
asserted violation." Id. at 366. But see Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653,
661-62 (9th Cir. 1978).
213. See cases cited note 104 supra.
214. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 555 F.2d at 984.
215. Id. The questions of affirmative disclosure and corrective advertising
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son, where the overbroad order was found to infringe on first amendment
commercial speech rights. This part of the order was not before the
Supreme Court in Professional Engineers because the government did not
seek review of the modification by the court of appeals. 21 6 Thus, a clear,
definitive resolution of the issue remains elusive.
It is reasonable to suggest, nevertheless, as the court of appeals did,
that in those cases where Pittsburgh Press would deny commercial speech
protection to economic communications because they are related to illegal
conduct, the charged party should not be denied, at the relief stage, the
other traditional first amendment defenses of overbreadth, vagueness,
and the requirement that the order be drawn as narrowly as possible.
When the antitrust violation has been established, Central Hudson's re-
quirement that the order be no more extensive than necessary to achieve
the governmental interest ought to be a restraining force within Profes-
sional Engineers' requirement that the relief represent a reasonable
method of eliminating the consequences of the illegal conduct. Moreover,
this approach is consistent with that utilized in Pittsburgh Press, where the
Court in reviewing the challenged order considered whether it was broader
than necessary to achieve the governmental interest.21 7 In other words, the
"reasonableness" standard should be interpreted to include Central Hud-
son's dictate that the scope of an order be only as broad as necessary to
reach speech that has a sufficiently close relationship to the anticompet-
itive conduct and its consequences. 21 8 Otherwise, the chill that might
result from overbreadth will affect the vigor of competition, through
reduced informational content in the marketplace. 219 As Central Hudson
have arisen in a variety of situations, e.g., Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v.
FTC, 605 F.2d 964 (7th Cir. 1979) (past practice to initiate deceptive sales con-
tacts designed to conceal commercial purpose; court upheld order requiring
affirmative disclosure of that purpose at initial contact), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
934 (1980); National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir.
1977) (order required affirmative statement of relationship between eggs and
heart disease; court modified to require only statement that there was a con-
troversy over that question), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); Warner-Lambert
Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (court upheld order requiring affir-
mative statement in all advertisements that Listerine did not help prevent colds),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978). Cf. Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611 (3d
Cir. 1976) (order banned use of deceptive sales phrase; court modified to allow
defendant the choice of curing the deception by explanatory language), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977). See generally Note, First Amendment Limitations
on FTC Corrective Advertising Orders, 66 GEO. L.J. 1473 (1978).
216. 435 U.S. at 686 n.8.
217. 413 U.S. at 390.
218. This standard has long been applied to review cease and desist orders of
the FTC. See note 113 supra. See generally Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473,476
(1974) (per curiam); FED. R. CIv. P. 65(d).
219. Recently, the Supreme Court expressed concern that over-deterrence
could chill "procompetitive conduct lying close to the borderline of impermissible
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instructs, the burden is on the regulatory authority to demonstrate that a
more limited, less sweeping order would not protect adequately the gov-
ernmental interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws and to assure that
the market intervention will not overregulate the market behavior.
V. CONCLUSION
AsJustice Stevens noted in Central Hudson, "speech proposing a com-
mercial transaction" embraces a wide range of activities. 220 In the antitrust
context, it includes the range of communications from the solicitation of
customers to the publication of price, production, and warranty informa-
tion. 221 Whether such communications will be shielded under the first
amendment from regulation will depend largely on an evidentiary analysis
under Pittsburgh Press and Central Hudson. Whether the enforcement
agency is the Justice Department or the FTC, the agency should be sen-
sitive to first amendment considerations, take into account the limitations
imposed by the Constitution, and proceed with caution when proposing
regulatory orders. The focus of the analysis should be the relationship the
communication has to other conduct which evidences anticompetitive ef-
fect. The role that the business communication plays with other facil-
itating devices cannot, however, be merely incidental. Nor should mere
parallel conduct suffice, in the absence of evidence indicating that the
communication was against the commercial self-interest of the speaker.
Moreover, evidence of the structure of the industry also may help predict
the effect that such conduct can have on marketplace competitiveness. It
should not, however, be the determining factor of illegality.
If the economic communication is an essential, substantial, or
facilitating part of a scheme violative of the antitrust laws, under Pitts-
burgh Press it will not be entitled to commercial speech protection. But
such conduct should not be proscribed under an order or injunction that
sweeps so broadly as to deter other conduct that may be competitive. The
traditional first amendment defenses such as the overbreadth doctrine, the
vagueness standard, and the narrowness test ought to be available to
insure that competitive speech, which is otherwise constitutionally pro-
tected, is not chilled. As long as there is a significant likelihood of substan-
tial overbreadth, there is utility in retention of the overbreadth doctrine,
at least in the single-party challenge context. This is true particularly with
regard to business communications in the nonmedia advertising area
where verification, the rationale behind the abolition of the overbreadth
conduct." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 (1978).
By analogy, this effect can be produced by an overbroad order, as well. See
generally Sullivan, New Perspectives in Antitrust Litigation: Toward a Right of
Comparative Contribution, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 389, 413-14.
220. 447 U.S. at 580 (Stevens, J., concurring).
221. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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doctrine, is inapplicable. At least, Central Hudson's admonition that the
regulatory authority bears the burden to establish affirmatively that an
order is no broader than necessary to achieve the interest advanced should
be applied to remedial orders approved under Pittsburgh Press.
In sum, the model of analysis with regard to constitutional limitations
on trade regulation orders which restrict commercial communications
should include the following inquiry: whether the speech/conduct comes
within one of the regulated categories, i.e., a false or deceptive com-
munication, or related to or an element of illegal conduct. If the conduct
does fall within one of these categories, it can be regulated. In regulating,
the agencies and courts should consider whether the order as drafted will
have a chilling effect on protected communications of either the defendant
or others. If the answer is in the affirmative, then traditional overbreadth
analysis should be applied if the overbreadth is substantial. This step in the
analysis is especially important, because of the application of the Mag-
nuson-Moss statute, if the order is an FTC cease and desist order. In addi-
tion, the court should consider whether the terms of the order are vague
and, therefore, susceptible to varying interpretations. Moreover, the agen-
cies and courts should determine if the order is broader than necessary to
effectuate the desired regulation. The existence of a chilling effect on pro-
tected conduct of the defendant or third parties is a relevant consideration
in this step of the analysis, but is not a prerequisite.
Finally, if the commercial speech/conduct is found not to be false,
deceptive, or related to an illegal practice, it can be regulated only if (1)
the regulating authority has a substantial interest to be served by the
regulation, (2) the order as drawn directly advances the stated governmen-
tal interest, and (3) the restriction is not more extensive than necessary to
serve the interest. Under either analysis, the regulatory authority has the
burden to demonstrate that the order meets the criteria.
While this Article has suggested that past trends in the enforcement of
the trade regulation laws by the Justice Department and FTC indicate a
tension between enforcement approaches and first amendment interests,
recent developments, most notedly under the FTC's "unfair acts and prac-
tices" authority under section 5, suggest that the Congress and the Reagan
Administration are inclined to scrutinize more carefully the regulatory
agencies' enforcement innovations. For instance, Congress withdrew
recently the Commission's "unfairness" jurisdiction to promulgate a rule
regulating television advertising for children.222 Subsequently, the FTC
staff recommended that a trade regulation rule to regulate advertising for
children was unworkable and that the rulemaking proceeding should be
terminated. 223 Similar concerns have been observed by officials of the new
222. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980).
223. 1008 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) AA-1 (April 2, 1981); 484
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 7 (April 6, 1981).
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Administration, 2 4 cautioning that the recent enforcement policies have
"reduced the amount of useful information"225 in the marketplace.
Moreover, the Commission apparently has made a conscious decision to
shift the enforcement emphasis from rulemaking to adjudication on a
case-by-case approach. 226 To the extent that these recent events portend a
shift in enforcement emphasis, the regulatory agencies and courts should
give more thoughtful consideration to the limitations placed on their
regulatory oversight responsibilities by the commercial speech doctrine
and to the first amendment constitutional implications of remedial orders,
so that competitively useful commercial information is not denied con-
sumers and competitors because of the deterrence that may result from
overbroad or vague orders. 227
224. See, e.g., Statement of David Stockman, Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget, before the House Government Operations Committee's
Consumer and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee (March 16, 1981), reprinted in
part in 1006 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) G-1 (March 19, 1981).
225. Id.
226. See, e.g., 1012 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-3 to -4 (April
30, 1981); 1001 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-16 (Feb. 12, 1981);
991 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-5 (Nov. 27, 1980); 488 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 3 (May 4, 1981); 487 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 9 (April 27,
1981); 483 TRADE REG. REP. (CCU) 10 (March 30, 1981).
227. See note 219 supra.
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